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I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Fidelity Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2327
(1992). Taxpayer sold schoolbooks and bereavement books pursuant to 2-year sponsorship
contracts, on which it paid commissions to its sales representatives promptly after its approval
of a sponsorship contract. Taxpayer deducted these commissions as they were earned and paid,
but recorded these commissions for financial accounting purposes ratably with the inclusion of
the book sale income [which was accrued as the books were shipped]. The § 446(a) conformity
requirement does not preclude taxpayer's accrual of commissions paid because § 446(a) does not
require absolute conformity; a § 446(b) change is impermissible because taxpayer's method of
accounting is an acceptable method which clearly reflects income.
2. Rev. Proc. 92-20, 1992-12 I.R.B. 10, modifying and superseding Rev.
Proc. 84-74, 1984-2 C.B. 736. New rules for obtaining IRS consent to charges in accounting
methods, designed to discourage taxpayers from delaying the filing of applications for permission
to change an impermissible accounting method. Taxpayer best off if done before being contacted
for examination; if not done before being contacted for examination, a limited 90-day window
period is provided for filing Form 3115 without first obtaining the district director's approval.
See, Seago, Abramowicz and Samuelson, "The Persuasive Powers Of Rev. Proc. 92-20," 56 Tax
Notes 791 (Aug. 10, 1992).
3. Rev. Rul. 92-28, 1992-15 I.R.B. 41. Contractors are permitted under
§ 460(e)(1) to use different methods for reporting income on long-term contracts, some of which
are subject to mandatory use of the percentage of completion method and some of which are
exempt from that requirement.
4. RLC Industries Co. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457 (1992).
Commissioner abused her discretion under 446(b) and Reg. 1.61 1-3(d)(5) in determining that
taxpayer was not entitled to include its California fee timberland together with its Oregon fee
timberlands in a single pool for purposes of computing depletion.
5. Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 818 (10th Cir
1992). Accrual method mobile home seller was required to report anticipated participation
interest [i.e., a portion of the interest rate charged to purchasers] from consumer installment
sales contracts it sold to finance companies in the tax year those contracts were sold, and not
only at the time checks were received from the finance companies, because under the all events"
test taxpayer had the right to receive participation interest.
6. I.R.S. Announcement 92-93, 1992-27 I.R.B. 43. The IRS plans to issue
a revenue procedure to allow taxpayers to change their method of accounting for multi-year
insurance policies purchased in connection with the sale of multi-year motor vehicle service
warranties, to allow amortizing the cost of the policies over the term of the policies.
7. Rev. Rul. 92-65, 1992-35 I.R.B. 6, modifying Rev. Rul. 91-30, 1991-1
C.B. 61. The portion of Rev. Rul. 91-30 that holds a personal service corporation that performs
veterinary services to be performing §448 "health" services and requires it (a) under §1 l(b)(2)
to use the 34% tax rate and (b) under §441(i) to use the calendar year, will not be applied to
taxable years beginning prior to 5/1.3/91 (with additional time for meeting the calendar year
requirement).
8. Rev. Proc. 92-74, 1992-38 I.R.B. 16. The IRS provides exclusive procedures
by which certain taxpayers required to use inventories may obtain expeditious consent to change
their accounting methods. See, also, Rev. Proc. 92-75, 1992-38 I.R.B. 22, wherein the IRS
provides the same type of guidance for taxpayers not using inventories.
B. Inventories
1. I.R.S. Announcement 91-173, 1991-47 I.R.B. 29. Taxpayers should file
Form 3115 for voluntary changes in method for LIFO inventory computations, pursuant to
Hamilton Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 120 (1991). The provisions relating to
category B methods of accounting under Rev. Proc. 84-74, 1984-2 C.B. 736, will apply in
determining the applicable § 481(a) adjustment period.
2. Hagen v. Commissioner, 951 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1991), remanding 57
T.C.M. (CCH) 1487 (1989). Commissioner's method of reconstruction of securities dealer's
cost of goods sold was held arguably to lack rational basis," so the issue was remanded to Tax
Court for further consideration.
3. Rev. Proc. 92-79, 1992-39 I.R.B. 13. Provides an alternative LIFO
inventory computation method for taxpayers engaged in the trade or business of retail sales of
new automobiles or light-duty trucks.
C. Installment Method
1. Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 54 (1992). Exchange
(1982) of stock in state-chartered stock S&L for passbook saving accounts and CDs in acquiring
federally-chartered mutual S&L was taxable, and (inasmuch as term account and CD principal
could not be withdrawn for 6 years) could be reported on an amended 1982 return (filed in
1987) as an installment sale. The accounts and CDs did not secure" the indebtedness, but
represented the purchaser's obligation.
2. Estate of Frane v. Commissioner, 98 T..C. 341 (1992) (reviewed, 5 judges
dissenting). Self-canceling installment notes held by decedent for amounts due from his children
on the sale to them of stock give rise to income under § 453B(a) and (f) at decedent's death
because the cancellation is to be treated as a disposition of the note. (The 20-year term of the
notes was less than decedent's life expectancy.) Estate of Moss v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1239
(1980) (treating SCIN as contingent), not followed.
3. Baker v. Comm., unpub. op. (7th Cir. 1992), aff'g., 60 T.C.M. (CCH)
1443. Although there should be no doubt on this subject, when a taxpayer reports income per
the installment method, it is the law in effect at the time of the receipt that governs its taxation
(and not the law in effect when the election is made).
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. Rev. Proc. 92-13, 1992-3 I.R.B. 28. Procedure for certain corporations
to obtain approval of a change of their annual accounting period.
2. Truck & Equipment Corp. of Harrisonburg v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 141
(1992). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(b)-lT, relating to the timing of deductions for employee
compensation (here, bonuses) received more than 21/2 months after the employer's year in which
the related services are rendered, is valid. Taxpayer failed to show it was unforeseeable either
administratively or economically impracticable to avoid the deferral of receipt because the
deferral was, in fact, foreseen.
3. T.D. 8408, 1992-19 I.R.B. 10, final § 461(h) regulations relating to the
economic performance requirement (4/9/92). See also Rev. Proc. 92-28, 1992-17 I.R.B. 12
(relating to ratable accrual of real estate taxes), and Rev. Proc. 92-29, 1992-17 I.R.B. 15
(relating to treatment of estimated costs of future improvements to subdivided real estate).
4. Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 964 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.
1992). Contract between taxpayer/construction company and U.S. Army to extend space shuttle
runway was not "substantially completed" under Treas. Reg. § 1.45-3(b)(2) until 1984 when the
entire project was finished and accepted by the Army. The fact that only $146,409 on a $22
million contract was paid in 1984 was irrelevant because progress payments before the end of
1983 had to be viewed in the context of required completion and payment bonds.
5. Rev. Rul. 92-51, 1992-27 I.R.B. 9, rendering obsolete Rev. Ruls. 71-119
[1971-1 C.B. 163], 70-567 [1970-2 C.B. 133], and 64-131 (third fact situation) [1964-1 C.B.
485]. This ruling applies § 468B(g), which provides that nothing in any provision of law shall
be construed as providing that an escrow account, settlement fund, or similar fund is not subject
to current income tax.
I. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Depreciation, Depletion. and Credits
1. 1T&S of Iowa, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 496 (1991). Taxpayer
permitted to depreciate under Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 -- on the cost savings" method -- the core
deposit intangible arising from the purchase of the First State Bank of What Cheer [Iowa], which
results in depreciation on an accelerated basis. Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner,
91 T.C. 463 (1988), aff'd without published opinion (11 th Cir. 1990), followed.
2. Rev. Rul. 92-25, 1992-14 I.R.B. 5. Rules for determining the portion of
total production attributable to a net profits interest, for purposes of determining § 613A(c)(2)
"average daily production."
3. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 232 (1992). Income
generated upon the exercise of nonstatutory employee stock options may constitute wages paid
or incurred for qualified services in calculating the § 41 [formerly § 44F] increasing research
credit.
4. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 242
(1992). Commissioner abused her discretion in denying taxpayer's application to revoke its
§ 185(c) election [to amortize railroad grading], which taxpayer sought in order to obtain the
benefits of depreciation and investment tax credit. The court found that the denial was motivated
by the IRS desire to compel adherence to its administrative position that grading was
nondepreciable -- a position that had been rejected by the courts -- and to preclude taxpayer from
relying on the favorable judicial decisions.
5. Jefferson-Pilot Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. No. 32 (1992). FCC
broadcasting license constitutes a § 1253 franchise, with a ratable portion of the purchase price
attributable to the license deductible under § 1253(d)(2). Tele-Communications, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 95 T.C. 495 (1990), on appeal to 10th Cir., followed. See, Raby, "Goodwill
Purchase Payments," 55 Tax Notes 661 (May 4, 1992).
6. Rev. Rul. 92-37, 1992-21 I.R.B. 5. Surviving spouse's basis for
calculating cost depletion on property representing her 1/2 share of community oil and gas
property for the taxable year of decedent's death is her adjusted basis as of the end of her
taxable year, i.e., a fair market value basis under § 1014(b)(6).
7. Rev. Rul. 92-38, 1992-21 I.R.B. 6. A production payment, the
consideration for which is used to purchase depreciable mining equipment to be used in
developing a mineral property, qualifies as a production payment carved out for development
under § 636(a), i.e., it is not a mortgage loan, and it does qualify as an economic interest in
the mineral property.
8. Nalle v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 9 (Aug. 5, 1992). ITC claimed on
rehabilitated buildings was disallowed because, prior to the start of the rehabilitation process,
the eight buildings were relocated from various cities in Texas to a business park in Austin --
even though 75% or more of the existing exterior walls were "retained" -- because
§48(g)(1)(A)(iii) requires the walls be "retained in place" and subsequently-proposed (and later
adopted as final) Treas. Reg. § 1.48-12(b)(5) provides that a relocated building does not qualify.
9. Canterbury v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 12 (1992). Taxpayers acquired
a number of McDonald's franchises, each by purchase of an existing McDonald's restaurant
operation for a purchase price in excess of the value of tangible assets. The Tax Court rejected
Commissioner's determination that the portion of each such excess allocable to §1253
amortizable franchise fees should be limited to the amount charged by the franchisor to the
original franchisee [$950 until 1960, $12,500 between 1960 and 1987, and $22,500 since 1987].
All other intangible assets acquired, including goodwill (except for a relatively small allocation
to going-concern value), were found to inhere in the franchise. See, Green, "Section 1253
Revisited: A Case Study Of Modem Reform," 56 Tax Notes 1329. (Sept. 7, 1992).
10. Newark Morning Ledger v. U.S., 945 F.2d 555 (3rd Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1583 (1992). Disallowed amortization of an acquired customer list ("paid
subscribers") because it was by definition indistinguishable from goodwill. See, Avi-Yonah,
"Newark Morning Ledger: A Threat To The Amortization Of Acquired Intangibles," 55 Tax
Notes 981 (May 18, 1992).
B. Expen
1. Employee Business Expenses.
a. Proposed regulations (EE-42-91) under § 61 and § 132, relating
(1) to employer-provided transportation furnished because of unsafe conditions
and (2) to the exclusion for public transit passes (56 Fed. Reg. 23,038 (1992) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.61 and 1.132). T.D. 8389, 1992-7 I.R.B. 4, final
regulations under §§ 61 and 132, relating to taxation and valuation of fringe
benefits and exclusion from gross income of certain fringe benefits (57 Fed. Reg.
1868 (1992)).
b. Proposed amendments of regulations (EE-46-91) under § 132,
relating to working condition fringe benefits (1) for transportation provided to
government employees for security concerns and (2) to bona fide volunteers who
perform services for exempt organizations or governmental units (56 Fed. Reg.
48,465 (1991) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.132)).
2. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991) (2-1), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992), aff g 94 T.C. 20 (1990) (reviewed). Anesthesiologist's home
office expenses were deductible under § 280A(c)(1) because the home office was his principal
place of business" under the Tax Court's new facts and circumstances" test which replaced the
focal point" test. The taxpayer spent a substantial amount of time in that office performing
essential managerial/administrative functions and there was no other location available for
performance of such functions. Dissent on the ground taxpayer did not do his most important
work at his home office nor did he spend the majority of his time there, following Pomerantz
v. Commissioner, 88-2 U.S.T.C. 9588 (9th Cir. 1988). See, Warren, "The Home Office
Deduction: An Objective Test Proposal For determining The Taxpayer's Principal Place Of
Business Under I.R.C. 280A(c)(1)(A)," 54 Tax Notes 867 (Feb. 17, 1992).
3. LNDOPCO Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992), afg, National
Starch & Chem, Corp. v, Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1990). Professional expenses
incurred by a target corporation in the course of a friendly takeover are not deductible under
§ 162(a) as ordinary and necessary business expenses because they were capital in nature, having
been "incurred for the purpose of changing the corporate structure for the benefit of future
operations." The fact that the expenditures do not create or enhance a separate and distinct
additional asset is not controlling. The Court noted that "[t]he notion that deductions are
exceptions to the norm of capitalization finds support in various aspects of the Code." See,
Raby, "Expenses That Benefit The Future: INDOPCO & The 'White Knights, 54 Tax Notes
1648 (March 30, 1992); Adams & Hinderliter, "INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Impact
Beyond Friendly Takeovers," 55 Tax Notes 93 (April 6, 1992); Javaras and Maynes, "Business
Expansion And Protection In The Post-INDOPCO World," 55 Tax Notes 971 (May 18, 1992);
Sheppard, "Is The IRS Abusing INDOPCO?," 56 Tax Notes 1110 (Aug. 31, 1992).
4. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-39 I.R.B. 7. In guidance on INDOPCO IRS holds
that that decision does not affect deductibility of advertising costs.
5. LTR 9240004. Relying on INDOPCO the IRS has ruled that costs for the
removal and replacement of asbestos insulation must be capitalized.
6. In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 950 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
Break-up fees paid to "white knights" [DeBartolo and Macy's] in connection with failed mergers
were deductible either as § 162(a) business expenses or as 165(a) abandonment losses. National
Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426 (3rd Cir. 1990), distinguished because
the mergers here never materialized. See, also, In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 B.R.
962 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (neither § 269 nor § 382 limited the use of NOLs).
7. Frederick Wiseman Co. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 563 (1991) (reviewed).
Amount paid in redemption of corporation's outstanding shares from all but one shareholder and
the incidental expenses incurred in connection with the redemption, which was brought about
by an outside force and necessary to the survival of the corporation's automobile distributorship
business, are not deductible under § 162(a). They are nondeductible capital expenditures
[nonamortizable because of the § 311(a) prohibition against gain or loss recognition on stock
redemptions]. See also § 162(k). Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir.
1966), revg 40 T.C. 379 (1963), not followed because it has been sapped of any remaining
vitality" by the Supreme Court's Gilmore [372 U.S. 39 (1963)]/Hilton Hotels [397 U.S. 580
(1970)]/Woodward [397 U.S. 572 (1970)1/Arkansas Best [485 U.S. 212 (1988)] line of cases.
8. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 92-1 U.S.T.C.
50,018 (Cls. Ct. 1991). Unrelated business (44% and 66% during the years in issue) written
by a Bermuda captive insurance company was sufficient to reduce significantly the risk to which
the insured parent was exposed, and thus transferred the bulk of the risk to the captive insurance
company. The Tax Court trilogy of Sears Roebuck & Co., 96 T.C. 61, modified, id. at 671
(1991); The Harper Group, 96 T.C. 45 (1991); and AMERCO, 96 T.C. 18 (1991) involved
unrelated business of 99%, 30% and 52% to 74%, respectively.
9. Chicago Stadium Corp. v. United States, 91-2 U.S. T.C. 50,352 (N.D.
Ill. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992). Payments in 1977 to majority (50.1%)
shareholder-employee of sporting arena corporation of $30,000 plus 50% of corporation's gross
receipts from Chicago Bulls' 1973 lease was unreasonable compensation; only the amount
allowed by the IRS ($138,000 of $335,700 total payments) was deductible. Corporation lost
$340,000 in 1977. Court rejected the contention that shareholder acquired a share of the
Chicago Bulls in order for the Bulls to remain as a tenant.
10. Noyce v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 670 (1991). Expenses and depreciation
of private airplane were deductible by vice chairman of Intel Corporation. Deductions for
depreciation under § 168 are not subject to the § 162 requirements that they be "ordinary and
necessary" or reasonable in amount; the only requirement is that the depreciable property be
used in the taxpayer's trade or business.
11. Rev. Proc. 91-67, 1991-2 c.b. 887. Business mileage rate for 1992 is 28¢
per mile, charitable rate is 12C, and medical and moving rate is 9c.
12. Rev. Rul. 92-3, 1992-3 I.R.B. 4. Day care provider should compute the
280A deduction by multiplying total costs by two fractions: (1) total square footage used in the
business over total square footage of the home, and (2) total hours the business is operated
(including preparation and cleanup) over total number of hours in a year (i.e., 8760 or, for
1992, 8784).
13. Rev. Rul. 92-29, 1992-16 I.R.B. 4, modifying Rev. Rul. 70-40, 1970-1
C.B. 50. Deduction of sole proprietor's Schedule C return preparation expenses are allowable
under § 62(a)(1) above the line and are not subject to the § 67 2% floor. Expenses incurred in
resolving asserted tax deficiencies relating to the sole proprietorship are to be similarly treated.
See, also LTR 9234009. Also, Storrer, "Deducting Tax-Related Professional Fees," 51 Tax
Notes 1575 (June 24, 1991); Raby, "Is It A Business Expense When The Self-Employed Pay
Interest On Deficiencies Or Accounting Fees?," 54 Tax Notes 683 (Feb. 10, 1992). Note, IRS
acq. in Standing v. Comm., 28 T.C. 789 (1957), aff'd., 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1958), holding
that legal fees in defending against deficiency notice were business expenses. AOD No. 1992-
14.
14. King's Court Mobile Home Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 511
(1992). Taxpayer's original return omitted $58,000 of rental income which was diverted by its
controlling shareholder. The amended return included the amount in income and increased its
deduction for wages in the same amount. Held, the $58,000 was not paid to the controlling
shareholder with the intent to compensate, so taxpayer was not entitled to deduct that amount.
15. LTR 9202003. See, "Hog Farmer's Transfer Of Hogs To Wife As
Compensation" For Work Makes Her Eligible For IRA Deduction," Letter Ruling Review, Feb.
1992 (attached). See, also, LTR 9206008 ("Failure To Honor Niceties Causes Farmer To Lose
Deduction For Rental Payments To Spouse," Letter Ruling Review, March 1992 (attached)).
16. Allied Signal, Inc. v. Comm., T. C. Memo. 1992-204. Held that taxpayer
fined in a criminal proceeding on pollution charges is not entitled to deduction for pollution fund
payment that reduces criminal fine. See, Raby, "No Deduction For Pollution Fund Payment
That Reduces Criminal Fine," 55 Tax Notes 943 (May 18, 1992).
C. Losses and At-Risk
1. Proposed regulations (PS-39-89) under § 469, relating to the treatment of
self-charged items of income and expense for passive activity loss purposes (56 Fed. Reg.
14,034 (1991) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1,469.).
2. American Offshore, Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 579 (1991) (reviewed).
Taxpayers were not barred from claiming a § 166 bad debt deduction for worthlessness of an
installment obligation by the § 453 rules which [under § 453B(a) and (f) limit the deferral
available if an installment obligation is disposed of or cancelled; i.e., the § 166 deduction is not
precluded by § 453B(a) or (f).
3. Holden v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 160 (1992). Taxpayers were required
to recalculate their alternative minimum tax for 1980 to take into account a net operating loss
carryback from 1983.
4. Callahan v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 276 (1992). Taxpayers/limited
partners were subject to overcalls of three times their cash contributions, but could by written
notice elect out of the overcall provision so long as the partnership was solvent. Held, the
overcall obligation is contingent and illusory, so taxpayers' 465 amounts at risk are limited to
their cash contributions. Pritchett v. Commissioner, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'g and
remanding 85 T.C. 580 (1985), distinguished.
5. Proposed regulations (PS-01-89) under § 469, relating to the definition
"activity" for passive activity loss purposes (57 Fed. Reg. 20,802 (1992) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. § 1.469)). Definition adopts a facts-and-circumstances" approach. See also T.D. 8417,
1992-24 I.R.B. 70, final and temporary regulations under § 469 (57 Fed. Reg. 20, 747 (1992)
(promulgated to avoid disputes about whether prior temporary regulations "sunset" under
7805(e)(2)). See, Grace, "Proposed Passive 'Activity' Regulations Substitute Rough Justice for
Mechanical Tests," 77 J. Tax. 68 (1992); "New Passive Loss 'Activity' Regs Get Good
Reviews," 55 Tax Notes 1024 (May 25, 1992); "Passive Activity Loss Regs Called 'Spectacular'
at Hearing," 56 Tax Notes 1246 (Sept. 7, 1992).
6. Woodall v. Commissioner, 964 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1992). Claimed § 165
partnership loss deduction of $78,441 on nightclub fire was reduced to $8,541 because schedule
L balance sheet attached to nightclub's partnership tax return stated that $8,451 was the adjusted
basis of all depreciable partnership assets at the beginning of the year. Portillo v.
Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1991), distinguished on the ground that the IRS here
relied upon taxpayer's statement, not another's statement.
7. LTR 9152004. See, "Passive Loss Disallowed For AMT May Not Be Carried
Back To Pre-Enactment Year," Letter Ruling Review, Feb. 1992 (attached).
8. LTR 9220003. See, "Physical Abandonment Of Nuclear Plant Not Necessary
To Secure Abandonment Loss," Letter Ruling Review, June 1992 (attached).
D. Business Income
1. Breakell v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 282 (1991). In computing alternative
minimum tax, the 58(h) adjustment for items that do not result in the reduction of regular tax
will follow the principles of First Chicago Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 663 (1987), affld
842 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1988). The court held that only that portion of the non-utilized § 1202
preference deduction (a total of $163,354 out of the total § 1202 deduction of $427,646) that did
not contribute to the negative adjusted gross income ($4,527) was eligible for § 58(h) treatment;
the remaining $158,895 (equal to negative AGI) had already been taken into account in
computing AMT.
2. LTR 9210004. See, "Transfer of Crops To Spouse Doesn't Avoid SE Income
But This May Not Always Be So," Letter Ruling Review, April 1992 (attached). See, also,
LTR 9229002, "Crop Transfer Again Fails To Reduce SE Tax Burden," Letter Ruling Review,
Aug. 1992 (attached)).
II. CAPITAL GAIN AND LOSS
1. Guardian Industries Corp. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 308 (1991). Silver-
bearing waste material generated in the course of taxpayers' photofinishing business is § 1221(1)
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business; therefore,
income from 228 such sales of silver waste to refiners during a 2-year period (giving rise to
37%-39% of taxpayer's net income) is ordinary income, and not short-term capital gain. The
environmental, etc. reasons for extracting the silver waste from discharged waste waters are not
conclusive of the purpose for which the silver waste was held.
2. Bramblett v. Commissioner, 960 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'g 59
T.C.M. (CCH) 876 (1990). Partnership sales of investment real estate to a related corporation
[identically owned by partnership's four partners], which developed the real estate and sold it
to various third parties, produced capital gains because the partnership was not directly in the
business of selling land [neither frequency nor substantiality of sales]. The corporation was not
the agent of the partnership and its activities cannot be attributed to the partnership; it had as
a major independent business reason for its existence the insulation of the individuals from
unlimited liability during the development process.
3. Dial v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1992). Affirms summary
judgment holding treasury bill futures contracts to be capital assets, even though former § 122(5)
[repeaed by 1981 ERTA, but in effect during tax years in question] excepted any "obligation
of the United States" from capital-asset treatment, because the futures contracts are not
"hedges." Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988), followed.
4. Eck v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 1 (1992). Christmas tree farmer who
sold individual trees to retail customers [by use of a "Tree Cutting Permit" arrangement before
payment] did not retain an economic interest in the trees within the meaning of § 631(b) in order
to be entitled to capital gains treatment on the sales; no binding contract was entered into prior
to the cutting.
5. Aizawa v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 10 (1992). Taxpayers owned
rental property with an original cost in 1981 of $120,000 and an adjusted basis of $100,091.38.
The property was subject to a recourse purchase money (seller-financed) mortgage of $90,000.
In 1987, the property was sold by the sellers at a foreclosure sale for $72,700, and the sellers
obtained a deficiency judgment of $60,800 [$133,500 minus $72,700] against the cash-basis
taxpayers. [The $133,500 consists of $90,000 mortgage principal; $18,000 accrued and unpaid
interest; $25,000 attorney's fees; and $500 court costs.] In view of the clear separation between
the foreclosure sale and the unpaid recourse liability, the amount realized was equal to the$72,700 proceeds of the foreclosure sale, resulting in a loss on the sale of $18,391.38, with
future payments of principal nondeductible and any subsequent discharge of the indebtedness
treated as income (to the extent of borrowed funds that have not been repaid). The
Commissioner argued for a loss of $10,091.38, contending that the amount realized was the$90,000 unpaid mortgage principal; the opinion indicated that this might be proper where "the
unpaid recourse liability for mortgage principal [does not] survive as part of a deficiencyjudgment." Taxpayer contended that the $60,800 deficiency judgment should be deducted from
the $90,000 mortgage principal to arrive at an amount realized of $29,200, for a loss of
$70,891.38; this has the defect of not having added the unpaid accrued interest, attorneys fees,
and court costs to unpaid mortgage principal, or (alternatively) of omitting them from the
calculated deficiency judgment.
6. Wdliford v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (1992).
Collector/part-time art dealer who sold eight paintings for a profit of $1,757,875 from his
private collection in two years was entitled to capital gains treatment because he did not
advertise, held the art for several years and devoted minimal time and effort to the sales.
Negligence penalty applied for deducting expenses relating to taxpayer's investment paintings
on his Schedule C.
7. Standley v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 13 (1992). Amounts received
through a "dairy termination program" (in part to compensate farmers who, under the program,
sold dairy herd cows for slaughter) in excess of the fair market value of cows for dairy purposes
are ordinary income, and not 1231 capital gains income, because the excess was intended to
replace receipts from the milk production operation. Goodwill with respect to the operation of
a dairy farm was not sold because taxpayer only agreed not to be a dairy farmer for five years.
III. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
1. McLennan v. United States, 91-2 U.S.T.C. 49,893 (Cls. Ct. 1991).
Charitable deduction allowed for transfer of scenic easement to conservancy over government
objections that taxpayers lacked donative intent and conservation objectives, but made the
transfer to maintain their property values and to receive a tax deduction.
2. Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1991).
"Official Big Game Hunter of Louisiana" was allowed to deduct as a charitable contribution the
value of his animal hunting trophies donated to the State of Louisiana.
3. Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 415 (1991).
Newspaper publisher's donation of its clippings library to a charitable organization does not give
rise to any deduction because (a) it falls within the § 1221(3) category of letter or memorandum,
or similar property" as an archive" under Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(2), which is ordinary
income property on which contributions would be disallowed under § 170(e)(1)(A), and (b) the
§ 1221(3)(B) provision covering a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or produced"
applies to corporations.
4. Powell v. United States, 945 F.2d 374 (11th Cir. 1991), vacating and
remanding 91-1 U.S.T.C. 50,117 (S.D. Fla. 1990). On issue of deductibility of payments to
Church of Scientology of Florida, dismissal of taxpayer's complaint reversed and taxpayer given
the opportunity to show the IRS's administrative inconsistency in allowing deductions to
members of other religions who make quid pro quo payments. Hernandez v. Commissioner,
490 U.S. 680 (U.S. 1989), distinguished because there wasn't a proper factual record to
establish the IRS's discordant treatment of religious contributions."
5. Ann Jackson Family Foundation v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 534 (1991)
(reviewed). Private nonoperating foundation was not required to include in § 4942(d)
"distributable amount" for the § 4942(a) excise tax on undistributed income of private
foundations, distributions received from § 4947(a)(2) split-interest trust. Interpretative
Foundation Excise Tax Reg. § 53.4942(a)-2(b)(2) was invalidated because the 1981 ERTA
amendment to § 4942 limited the required distribution to a minimum investment return" of 5%
of the foundations assets," not to adjusted net income."
6. Guide Intl. Corp. v. United States, 948 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1991).
Nonprofit organization whose membership was restricted to owners of IBM mainframes did not
quality as a § 501 (c)(6) exempt business league because it primarily promoted one segment of
the mainframe computer business and not a line of business.
7. I.R.S. News Release IR-92-4 (Jan. 17, 1992) and I.R.S. Announcement
92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51. Payments to tax-exempt organizations for extensive promotions of
payors constitute advertising income subject to the § 511 et seq. unrelated business income tax,
and not nontaxable contributions, under examination guidelines proposed. As a matter of audit
tolerance, the IRS will not apply the guidelines to purely local organizations that receive
relatively insignificant gross revenue from corporate sponsors and generally operate with
significant amounts of volunteer labor.
8. Hodgdon v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 424 (1992). The § 101 (b) bargain
sale" rule is applicable for gain recognition purposes to an otherwisevalid charitable contribution
that must be carried over to a future taxable year, as is provided by Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1011-2(a)(2).
9. Texas Learning Technology Group v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir. 1992). Section 501(c)(3) organization created by an interlocal agreement among 11 school
districts does not qualify for the § 509(a)(1) "political subdivision" exception from private
foundation status because it has not been delegated any authority to exercise sovereign power.
10. I.R.S. Announcement 92-81, 1992-22 I.R.B. 56. Proposed revenue
procedure providing guidelines to simplify the process of substantiating compliance with the
§§ 401(a)(4), 410(b), etc. nondiscrimination rules.
11. I.R.S. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59, reprinting IRM Manual
Transmittal 7(10)69-38 (March 3, 1992). Guidelines to be used in the examination of
tax-exempt hospitals; includes issues relating to (1) the community benefit standard, (2) private
inurement and private benefit, (3) unreasonable compensation and other inurement issues, and
(4) joint ventures.
12. Thorne v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 4 (1992). Trustee of charitable
foundation was held liable for § 4944(a)(2) and § 4945(a)(2) first-tier taxes, for knowingly
making investments which jeopardized charitable purposes [depositing foundation corpus in
unlicensed Bahamian bank] and making taxable expenditures [failing to exercise expenditure
responsibility on grants], respectively, as well as the additional 6684 penalty for willful and
flagrant conduct.
13. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-29 I.R.B. 11. Guidelines for public interest law
firms exempt under § 501(c)(3), including procedures under which a public interest law firm
may accept fees for its services. Guidelines attempt to distinguish between "representation of
a broad public interest" and "representation of ... a private interest."
14. LTR 9137002. See, "Universities Can Avoid UBI From Athletic Program
Advertising," Letter Ruling Review, Nov. 1991 (attached). See, also, LTR 9137009 ("Exempt
Org's Newsletter Doesn't Produce UBI, But Ads Do," Letter Ruling Review, Nov. 1991
(attached)) and LTR 9211004 ("Ad Income is UBI, As Usual, But Per American College, May
Not Always Be," Letter Ruling Review, April 1992 (attached)).
15. LTR 9204007, See, "Only Membership Dues Considered In Determining UBI
From Advertising Income," Letter Ruling Review, March 1992 (attached).
16. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-29 I.R.B. 11. Sets forth guidelines for public
interest law firms, including procedures under which a public interest law firm may accept fees
for its service.
IV. INTEREST
1. Proposed regulations (IA-120-86) under § 263A(f) relating to the
requirement to capitalize interest with respect to the production of production of property (56
Fed. Reg. 40,815 (1991) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1.263).
2. Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-3 I.R.B. 27. Points paid by cash basis taxpayers
for the acquisition of a principal residence are deductible if: (1) so designated on Uniform
Settlement Statement; (2) computed as a percentage of amount borrowed; (3) charged under
established business practice; (4) paid for acquisition of principal residence; and (5) paid directly
by taxpayer. See Rev. Proc. 92-11, 1992-3 I.R.B. 26 (guidance provided for filing information
returns for points received in connection with the financing of the purchase of a principal
residence); see also Rev. Rul. 92-2, 1992-3 I.R.B. 5.
3. T.D. 8410, 1992-21 I.R.B. 7, final regulations under § 861, relating to
the allocation and apportionment of affiliated group interest expense (57 Fed. Reg. 13,019
(1992)).
V. NONTAXABLE EXCHANGES
1. T.D. 8346, 1991-1 C.B. 150. Final regulations under § 1031, relating to
deferred exchanges (56 Fed. Reg. 19,933 (1991)). Held, not to be applicable to reverse-Starker
transactions.
2. Balding v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 368 (1992). Taxpayer's relinquishment
of her community property interest in her husband's military retirement benefits in exchange for
settlement payments from her husband does not give rise to income recognition because of the
gift treatment mandated by § 1041. See, Kasner, "The Tax Consequences Of Community
Property Transfers," 55 Tax Notes 1517 (June 15, 1992).
3. LTR 9227002. S corporation's sale of professional sports franchise not eligible
for § 1033 involuntary conversion relief where it was the sports stadium (owned by a related, but
separate, partnership consisting of the S corporation shareholders and family members), and not
the team, that was threatened with condemnation by the city, even though the league required
common family ownership of the team and its home stadium. See, "IRS Refusal To Apply
Economic Unit Test In Denial Of Section 1033 Appears Questionable," Letter Ruling Review,
Aug. 1992.
4. LTR 9138002. See, "IRS Denies It Has Authority Under §1033 To Extend Time
for Election," Letter Ruling Review, Nov. 1991 (attached).
5. LTR 9209007. See, "IRS Denial Of 1033 Eligibility For Hurricane Damage To
Trees Is Questionable," Letter Ruling Review, April 1992 (attached). See, also, relating to the
same subject, LTR 9131034, "Timber Owner's §631 Gain Caused by 'Hugo' Eligible For
§1033," Letter Ruling Review, Sept. 1991 (attached).
6. LTR 9148025. See, "Imposition of Restrictions Can Result in Involuntary
Conversion," Letter Ruling Review, Jan. 1992 (attached).
7. LTR 9232004. See, "Disclaimer, Causing Property To Pass Directly, Identifies
Party To Make 1033 Election," Letter Ruling Review, Sept. 1992 (attached).
8. LTR 9224006. See, "Section 1033 Replacement Property Can Be Acquired From
Related Party," Letter Ruling Review, July 1992 (attached).
9. LTR 9215049. See, "Grant Of Easement Qualifies As 'Like-Kind' For 1031 Swap,"
Letter Ruling Review, May 1992.
VI. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Rev. Rul. 91-51, 1991-2 C.B. 434. Georgia has enacted a revised form
limited partnership act (Ga. Code Ann., §§ 14-9-100 through 14-9-1204) that corresponds to the
ULPA for Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 purposes.
2. Affiliated Equipment Leasing I v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 575 (1991).
Tax Court lacks jurisdiction over former § 6612(c) interest on tax-motivated transactions in a
partnership level proceeding because it is an "affected item" that can only be determined at the
individual partner level.
3. Carmel v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 265 (1992). In a proceeding
determining adjustments to nonpartnership items, husband sought § 6013(e) innocent spouse
relief with respect to possible adjustments of partnership items attributable to wife's interest in
a TEFRA partnership. Held, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to order Commissioner to issue
an affected item" notice of deficiency at the end of the partnership proceeding; the existing
statutory scheme does not provide a prepayment forum to raise the issue of innocent spouse
relief with respect to a liability attributable to an investment in a TEFRA partnership.
4. Harris v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 6 (1992). NOL carrybacks
attributable to settlement of partnership items of a TEFRA partnership may be taken into account
in a Rule 155 computation in partners' personal tax (non-TEFRA) proceeding.
5. Treaty Pines Investment Partnership v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1992). Tax Court improperly refused to exercise jurisdiction to rule on the validity of a
settlement with IRS concerning taxpayers' partnership items, and (inasmuch as the settlement
was valid despite its not being on Form 906) the Tax Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to order taxpayers to comply with the terms of the Notice of Final Partnership Administrative
Adjustment.
6. McKnight v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 8 (1992). Small partnership
exception in TEFRA applies to "simple" partnerships where the same-share rule is satisfied, as
it was according to Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)-IT(a)(3) where only items "available for
distribution" during the year were considered, and certain other items (i.e., those consistently
exclusive to a partner) were excluded from the rules.
7. Hambrose Leasing 1984-5 Limited Partnership v. Comm., 99 T.C. No. 15
(1992). The determination of a partner's amount "at-risk" with respect to partnership liabilities
personally assumed is not a partnership item, but is an "affected item" with respect to which the
Tax Court lacks jurisdiction in a partnership level proceeding.
8. Dubin v. Comm., 99 T.C. No. 17 (1992). Held that determination under
"bankruptcy rule" (§6231(a)(12)) must be made for each spouse-partner separately.
9. Aufleger v. Comm., 99 T.C. No. 5 (1992). Held that unexpired portion of
3-year limitations period is "tacked" on to period during which running of period is suspended
under §6229(d).
10. Rev. Proc. 92-33, 1992-17 I.R.B. 28. IRS clarifies "free transferability of
interests" standard indicating that the partnership will fail that standard if the transferability of
more than 20% of all interests is restricted.
B. Miscellaneous
1. Echols v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
denying petition for reh'g of 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991). Taxpayer entitled to take a § 165(a)
loss deduction for a worthless interest in a partnership, whether or not title had been divested
or the partnership interest had been abandoned. The test for worthlessness is a combination of
a subjective determination by the taxpayer of the fact and year of worthlessness to him, and the
existence of objective factors reflecting completed transaction(s) and identifiable event(s) in the
year in question." The alternative holding of the original decision is reaffirmed.
2. Schneer v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 643 (1991) (reviewed, 2 judges
dissenting). Assignment of income by partner to partnership respected for tax purposes because
the court concluded that taxpayer partner "earned" the income while a partner of the partnership
to which he had agreed to pay such income. Generally, income of a type normally earned by
the partnership may be freely assigned by the partner where the venture was not formed merely
to avoid the effect of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Concurring (Beghe and another
judge) say income to individual, with § 162(a) deduction. Dissents say partner was the true
earner because (Wells) the fees were for past services" and (Halpern) because the fees were
earned by the taxpayer and § 721 precludes any deduction. See, Sheppard, "Partnership
Mysticism and the Assignment-of-Income Doctrine," 54 Tax Notes 8 (Jan. 6, 1992); Asimow,
Applying the Assignment of Income Principle Correctly," 54 Tax Notes 607 (Feb. 3, 1992);
Cowan, "Tax Court Leaves Confusion In Wake Of Decision On Assignment Of Income To
Partnership," 55 Tax Notes 1535 (June 15, 1992); Kamin, "Analyzing Partnerships' Assignment
Of Income In Schneer," 57 Tax Notes 129 (Oct. 5, 1992).
3. T.D. 8380, 1992-2 I.R.B. 4, final regulations under § 752, relating to the
treatment of partnership liabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 66,348 (1991).
4. T.D. 8385, 1992-5 I.R.B. 4, final regulations under § 704, relating to the
allocation among partners of certain losses or deductions and certain income or gains attributable
to partnership nonrecourse liabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 66,978 (1991).
5. Rev. Rul. 92-15, 1992-12 I.R.B. 6. Provides for adjustment in basis of
lower-tier partnership property where the upper tier partnership distributes property to a partner
and, both partnerships having made § 754 elections, under § 734(b) adjusts the basis of its
interest in the lower tier partnership. Similar rules for the distribution of a lower-tier
partnership interest to a partner of the upper-tier partnership where § 732(a)(2) applies to limit
the distributee partner's basis in the partnership interest.
6. Weiss v. Commissioner, 956 F.2d 242 (1 lth Cir. 1992). Partner did not
realize § 752(b) capital gain upon the forfeiture of his partnership interest [for failure to meet
a capital call] on the dissolution of a Florida motel operation partnership because he continued
to be liable on his share of partnership liabilities, i.e., his personal guarantee of a bank loan to
the partnership.
7. Rev, Proc. 92-33, 1992-17 I.R.B. 28, supplementing Rev. Proc. 89-12,
1989-1 C.B. 798. The IRS will rule that a partnership lacks free transferability of interests if
the partnership agreement restricts transferability of partnership interests representing more than
20% of all interests in partnership capital, income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit. (Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(I) provides that free transferability exists if members owning "substantially
all" of the interests of an entity can freely substitute a non-member.)
8. Rev, Proc. 92-35, 1992-18 I.R.B. 21. The IRS will not take the position
that a limited partnership has "continuity of life" if local law or the partnership agreement
provides that the remaining general partners (or at least a majority in interest of all remaining
partners) may agree to continue the partnership upon the bankruptcy or removal of a general
partner. (Compare Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, where the IRS would not rule if less
than a majority in interest could continue the partnership.)
9. Rev. Rul. 92-49, 1992-26 I.R.B. 8, amplifying Rev. Rul. 57-7, 1957-1
C.B. 435. IRS will continue to take the position that the arrangement between the owner of
coin-operated amusements and the occupant of premises is a lease from the occupant (as lessor)
to the owner (as lessee). It will, however, not challenge a taxpayer's good faith position that
such an arrangement is a joint venture.
10. Mark IV Pictures, Inc. v. Commissioner, 969 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1992),
"ff 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1171. Affirms tax court findings that general partners in religious film
production limited partnership: (1) received their general partnership interests in exchange for
services rather than property [because lack of written contracts and arm's length negotiations
precluded partners from showing that film rights were exchanged for partnership interests], and
(2) received capital interests rather than profits interests [because of shift in capital occurring
at formation giving them the right to receive 50% of liquidation proceeds]. See, Raby,
"Receiving An Equity Interest For Services: Wherein Ordinary Income Can Be Offset By Capital
Loss," 56 Tax Notes 911 (Aug. 17, 1992).
VII. INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Miscellaneous Deductions and Credits
1. Cloud v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 613 (1991). Payments to the Democratic
Party made by deputy registrar of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles were nondeductible political
contributions. Negligence penalty inappropriate on this issue because payments were apparently
required; the Commissioner abused his discretion in not waiving the § 6661 penalty under
§ 6661 (c).
2. lanniello v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165 (1992). Taxpayers were forced
to forfeit the amount they skimmed from their restaurants and bars as a result of their RICO
convictions. The skimmed amounts are § 61 income in the 1981 and 1982 years of receipt even
though they were acquired unlawfully; fraud penalties were added. Taxpayers were not entitled
to § 165(a) loss deductions in those years because the skimmed amounts were not forfeited until
1989 and 1990. Neither the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause was violated.
3. O'Neill Irrevocable Trust v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 227 (1992).
Deduction for fees paid by trust for investment advice is subject to the § 67(a) 2%-of-AGI floor
because they are not § 67(e) costs which are unique to the administration of an estate or a trust
[such as trustee fees or trust accounting fees mandated by law or the trust agreement]. See,
Kasner, "Tax Court Decision Is Bad News For Trustees," 55 Tax Notes 369 (April 20, 1992).
4. Induni v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. No. 42 (1992). A portion of taxpayer's
§ 163(a) mortgage interest and § 164(a)(1) real property tax deductions must be disallowed under
§ 265(a) by reason of the deductions' partial allocability to a tax-exempt living quarters
allowance received by taxpayer as an INS employee stationed at Montreal and living in Canada.
The double benefit allowed military officers and ministers under § 265(a)(6) does not inure to
others.
5. Rev. Proc. 92-71, 1992-35 I.R.B. 17. Describes account statements that
will be accepted as proof of payment for purposes of substantiating deductions in lieu of
producing cancelled checks, such as bank account statements and credit card charge statements
that show the amount, the date and the name of the payee. (The date shown, however, is not
necessarily the date of the deduction.)
6. LTR 9218067. See, "Donor Gets Current Charitable Deduction Even Though
Property Is Actually Transferred In Later Period," Letter Ruling Review, June 1992 (attached).
7. LTR 9147049. See, "Charitable Contribution of Nondepreciable Musical
Instrument Results in Full Tax Benefit," Letter Ruling Review, Jan. 1992 (attached).
8. Rev. Proc. 92-12, 1992-3 I.R.B. 1. IRS sets forth requirements for deduction
of mortgage points.
13. Damage
1. Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff g 57
T.C.M. 9(CCH) 816 (1989). Damages for the settlement of a racial discrimination complaint
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were taxable, and were not § 104(a)(2) personal
injury payments because that section is limited to an award of money recoverable in an action
at law and Title VII provides only for equitable relief [back pay being an equitable remedy akin
to restitution]. The court rejects Burke [929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991)] and Rickel 900 F.2d
655 (3rd Cir. 1990)].
2. Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1 (1992). Portion of settlement payment
(1/6) received by college professor on account of a potential racial discrimination claim by
tenured faculty member was excludable under § 104(a)(2), but remaining portion (5/6) received
on account of a contract claim for failure to notify of termination before February 1st was
taxable.
3. Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir.
1991). Damages for age discrimination were excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2),
so tax withholding by defendant was improper.
4. Ray v. United States, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,210 (Cls. Ct. 1992). Damages
received in the settlement of a labor dispute arising from employer's breach of a collective
bargaining agreement were not excludable under § 104(a)(2) because they were not payments
for personal injury.
5. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (7-2), rev' 929 F.2d 1119
(6th Cir. 1991). Backpay awards in settlement of Title VII [here, sex discrimination] claims are
not excludable from gross income as § 104(a)(2) personal injury damages because Title VII
permits the award of only backpay and other injunctive relief, and not the recompense for any
other traditional harms associated with personal injury permitted by other federal
antidiscrimination statutes. (The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, expanded Title VII's remedial scope, effective 11/21/91, to permit compensatory and
punitive damages.) Helleloid and Mattson, "Has the Scope of the Personal Injury Exclusion
Been Changed by the Supreme Court?," 77 J. Tax. 82 (1992).
6. O'Gilvie v. U.S., 1992 West Law 223847 (D.Kan). District Court, on
rehearing, reverses prior position and holds that punitive damages received as a result of
personal injury are excludible under §104(a)(2). See, generally, Jaeger, "Taxation Of Punitive
Damage Awards: The Continuing Controversy," 57 Tax Notes 109 (Oct. 5, 1992).
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Montelepre Systemed. Inc. v. Commissioner, 956 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1992). Payment of $1.5 million to taxpayer-hospital operator for giving up a contractual right
of first refusal was properly characterized as § 83 compensation in the year received because that
was the first year that taxpayer's contractual right ceased being subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture.
2. T.D. 8411, 1992-22 I.R.B. 4, final regulations under § 7701(b), relating
to the definition of a resident alien (57 Fed. Reg. 15,237 (1992)). See also, proposed regulations
(INTL-121-90) under § 6114, relating to reporting requirement if the residency of an individual
is determined under a treaty, 57 Fed. Reg. 15,272 (1992) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
§§ 301.6114 and 301.7701).
3. Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992-27 I.R.B. 7. The amount by which a nonrecourse
debt exceeds the fair market value of the property securing the debt is taken into account in
determining whether, and to what extent, a taxpayer is insolvent within the meaning of
108(d)(3) [excess of liabilities over FMV of assets], but only to the extent that the excess
nonrecourse debt is discharged.
4. Bannon v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 3 (1992). Payments received
by taxpayer from the state of California, under its In-Home Supportive Services Program, for
providing nonmedical care to her totally disabled adult daughter were includable in taxpayer's
gross income.
5. LTR 9143003. See, "In Shift, IRS Holds On-Site Meals Ineligible for § 119
Exclusion," Letter Ruling Review, Dec. 1991 (attached).
6. LTR 9143050. See, "Patent Infringement Proceeds Received by Divorced
Spouse Tax-free to Her Per §1041," Letter Ruling Review, Dec. 1991 (attached).
7. LTR 9134003. See, "Incorporated Farm May Deduct Meals and Lodging
Even Though Benefit Excluded by Incorporators," Letter Ruling Review, Oct. 1991 (attached).
8. LTR 9148001. See, "Cash Meal Allowances Not Excludable as a De
Minimis Fringe and Subject to Withholding," Letter Ruling Review, Jan. 1992 (attached).
9. LTR 9227035. See, "Excess Sick Leave Transferred To Account For
Payment Of Future Medical Expenses Is Taxable," Letter Ruling Review, Aug. 1992 (attached).
10. Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-36 I.R.B. 5. IRS provides that employer-provided
outplacement services are excludable as a working condition fringe (§132(d)) unless they are
offered in lieu of higher severance payments.
11. Bannon v. Comm., 99 T.C. No. 3 (1992). State payments for woman's
care of daughter were not excludable welfare benefits but were taxable compensation.
PROCEDURE, PENALTIES AND PROSECUTIONS
A. Penalties and Prosecutions
1. Barton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 548 (1991) (reviewed). Tax Court has
jurisdiction, in determining whether an overpayment exists, to determine taxpayers' liability for
increased interest under form § 6621 (c) on tax attributable to a tax-motivated transaction. White
v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 209 (1990), holding that increased interest under former § 6621(c)
was not part of a "deficiency" for Tax Court jurisdiction purposes, was distinguished.
2. Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1991) (2-1), rev'g and
remanding 90-2 U.S.T.C. 50,414 (E.D. Ky. 1990). Refund suit for $99,000 in penalties
imposed on accountant who prepared Form 941 quarterly employment tax returns that omitted
cash wages paid to his client's employees. The district court erred in applying the 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 five-year statute of limitations to assessment of § 6701 penalties because no statute of
limitations is applicable. It further erred in limiting the $10,000 penalties to one per year
because there were four quarterly taxable period[s]" in each of the two years involved.
2. Spitz v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.), revgyg
60 T.C.M. (CCH) 920 (1990). Government failed to prove civil fraud by clear and convincing
evidence against a [former IRS agent and] CPA and his wife who misreported fees that the CPA
earned from a tax shelter venturer, received by wife'under an erroneous social security number,
because taxpayers were believable, albeit "thoroughly disorganized," and the evidence of fraud
was weak and equivocal."
3. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-164, 105
Stat. 1049 (1991). The cost of extended jobless benefits will be offset by modifying the § 6654
estimated tax rules for noncorporate taxpayers for years after 1991. Those taxpayers whose
modified AGI exceeds $75,000 and is more than $40,000 over prior year's AGI (and who made
an estimated tax payment, or were penalized for failure to do so, in any of the three preceding
tax years) will no longer be able to use the 100% of prior year's tax alternative to avoid § 6654
penalties. Modified AGI does not include gains from involuntary conversions or from principal
residence sales, or increases in qualified pass-through items from less-than-10% interests in S
corporations or limited partnerships (except for general partners).
4. United States v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th
Cir. 1992). A net payroll lender under § 3505 who was also a § 6672 responsible person was
liable for interest on the unpaid withholding taxes up to the 25% [of the loan amount] limit of
§ 3505 despite the absence of any preassessment interest requirement in § 6672. The court was
"reluctant to truncate § 3505 in order to protect a nonexistent policy."
5. Goulding v. United States, 957 F.2d 1420 (7th Cir. 1992). Attorney
subjected to § 6694 preparer penalties under the Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b) "substantial
preparation" rule with respect to limited partners' tax returns by reason of his negligent
preparation of three tax shelter partnership returns and Schedules K-1.
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6. Rev. Rul. 92-54, 1992-27 I.R.B. 20. A corporation may avoid the
§ 6655(a) penalty for underpayment of estimated tax installments by relying on the preceding
year's tax liability under § 6655(d)(1)(B)(ii) only when the preceding year's tax return showed
a positive tax" liability, as opposed to a zero tax liability.
7. Leuhsler v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1992). Negligence
penalty imposed on CPA who invested in tax shelter master recording leases that lacked
economic substance. Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990), distinguished.
8. Knudsen v. United States, 966 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1992). Payment of FICA
taxes into federal depository account by corporation shortly before bankruptcy constitutes a
defense by responsible officer to § 6672 penalty for unpaid taxes, even though the bank
subsequently reversed its credit to the depository account and applied the monies towards
repayment of a commercial bank loan owed by the corporation.
9. Adler & Drobny Ltd. v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. I11. 1992).
Accountant who prepared Schedule K-1 was not the preparer of partners' individual returns
where the returns were complicated and the K-Is were not under §7701(a)(36) a "substantial
portion" of any of the returns. Goulding v. United States, 717 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1989),
affd, 957 F.2d 1420 (7th Cir. 1992), not followed.
10. Turpin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'g and
remanding 91-2 U.S.T.C. 50,403 (D. Md. 1991). President and sole shareholder of coal
operating company did not willfully fail to collect and pay over withholding taxes because he
reasonably believed that the company that owned the facility at which the mining took place had
paid the taxes.
11. Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 11 (1992). Fraud penalties
applied on tax protester's underpayments as a result of his failure to file returns or pay taxes,
or to file delinquent returns [which themselves omitted the lion's share of his income] until after
being notified of IRS's investigation. Cheek v. UnitedStates, 489 U.S. 192 (1991), followed
as it differentiates between a "good-faith misunderstanding of the law" and "a good-faith belief
that the law is invalid or a good-faith disagreement with the law," the latter entailing the
obligation of [taking] the risk of being wrong."
12. Rev. Proc. 92-23, 1992-13 I.R.B. 21. IRS identifies circumstances under
which disclosure on a taxpayer's return is adequate for purposes of reducing the understatement
of tax under §6662(d) and for purposes of the preparer penalty (§6694(a)). See, also, Notice
92-41, 1992-39 I.R.B. 1, providing that old Form 8275 may be used to disclose a position for
§6662 purposes.
13. Notice 92-40, 1992-38 I.R.B. 15. IRS details filing and payment extensions
for those affected by Hurricane Andrew. Sec. 6651.
B. Summons
1. Mimick v. United States, 952 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g and
remanding 91-1 U.S.T.C. 50,070 (D. Neb. 1991). Third-party recordkeeper summons and
taxpayer summonses were enforceable even though the IRS failed to deliver attested copies [as
required by § 76031 because the IRS acted in good faith and taxpayer was not harmed.
2. PAA Management, Ltd. v. United States, 962 F.2d 212 (2nd Cir.
1992). Reversing district court order quashing 7602 summonses that were issued to third-party
recordkeepers alter final partnership administrative adjustments. The § 6223(f) provision that
only one FPAA may be sent to each partner for each year does not mean that the IRS's
determination is not subject to subsequent revision. Section 6230(h) provides that the summons
power is not to be circumscribed by § 6223(1).
3. DiAndre v. United States, 968 F.2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1992). No violation
of § 6103 occurred when the IRS disclosed certain tax return information in a circular letter sent
to the corporation's customers in the course of a criminal investigation where the disclosure met
the § 6103(k)(6) safe harbor, i.e., as relating to tax liability determination, that the information
sought not otherwise reasonably available and that the disclosures were necessary to obtain the
information sought.
C. Litigation Costs
1. Bayer v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 19 (1992) (reviewed), on
reconsideration of 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2890 (1991). Cost of living adjustments for the
§ 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) $75 hourly rate for attorney's fees should be computed from the 10/1/81
effective date of the Equal Access to Justice Act [28 U.S.C. § 2414,5 U.S.C. § 504], as opposed
to the 1/1/86 effective date of § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) because the circumstances surrounding
enactment of the I.R.C. provision show Congress intended to conform § 7430 to the EAJA as
far as possible. Tax Court adheres to its earlier decision and refuses to follow Cassuto v.
Commissioner, 936 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1991), which held that the 1/1/86 date for COLA
calculation applies.
2. Proposed regulations (IA-3-89) under § 7430, relating to the
circumstances which exhaustion of remedies has taken place for attorney's fee recoveries (57
Fed. Reg. 19,828 (1992)) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301.7430). Following Minahan v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492 (1987), in not requiring taxpayers to agree to extend the time for
assessment and collection.
3. Heasley v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'g. rev'g
and remanding 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2503 (1991). Attorney's fees awarded with respect to
negligence and substantial understatement penalties, but not valuation overstatement and
additional interest penalties on which the IRS "was not substantially justified," because taxpayers
"substantially prevailed." The $100 to $200 per hour actually charged by attorneys was reduced
to the $75 statutory rate, with COLA from 1/1/86 §7430 date - not from the 1/1/81 EAJA date.
4. Estate of Hubberd v. Comm.,. 99 T.C. No. 18 (1992). An estate is a
proper party for an award of litigation costs. The net worth requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§2412(d)(2)(B) apply to an award of litigation costs and the net worth of the estate is considered
in applying the statute.
D. Statutory Notice
1. Inverworld. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 70 (1992). Tax Court
petition addressed to statutory notice for taxpayer's liability for § 1441-1464 withholding tax
could not be amended to contest taxpayer's deficiencies in corporate income tax for the same
years that were determined by a separate statutory notice. The petition did not (1) indicate the
amount of deficiencies determined, (2) refer to or dispute what taxpayer is contesting, (3) refer
to or attach the separate statutory notice, which was not cured by a general statement in the
prayer for relief.
2. Powell v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1992). Tax Court erred
in dismissing taxpayers' petition for lack of jurisdiction where it was filed within 90 days of
taxpayers receipt of actual notice of the deficiency by means of an IRS notice of levy. The
2/29/88 notice of deficiency was insufficient because it was not mailed to taxpayers' last known
address where taxpayers had filed a tax return with a new address on 2/11/88.
3. Cross v, Commissioner, 98 T.C. No. 41 (1992). An Indian reservation
geographically bounded on all sides by the State of Washington is not "outside the United States"
within the meaning of § 6213(a), so a notice of deficiency sent to taxpayer residing there does
not allow him 150 days within which to file his Tax Court petition.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992), cert, granted,
112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992). Follows Siben v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) and
refuses to follow Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989), in finding passthrough
income from an S corporation on which the limitations period had run could be assessed against
individual shareholder whose limitations period was still open.
2. Felhaber v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1992), affg 94
T.C. 863 (1990). The limitations period for assessing a tax liability against an S corporation
shareholder begins to run from the date that the individual, not the S corporation, files his return.
Kelley v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1989), not followed. Section 6037(a) (last
sentence) applies only to the S corporation's own corporate-level taxes.
3. Crawford v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 302 (1991). The § 183(e)(4)
special statutory period for the assessment of a deficiency can be extended on a Form 872
agreement under § 6501(c)(4), entered into after the normal § 6501(a) three-year period of
limitations had expired.
4. Berry v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 339 (1991). A Form 872-A extension
of the statute of limitations for 1982, entered into more than 2 years after the overpayment
(through withholding) of taxpayers' 1982 tax [no return having been filed], does not revive the
expired time period for filing a claim for § 6512(b)(3) credit or refund of the overpayment of
tax because the Form 872-A was regarded as a legal nullity.
5. St. John v. United States, 951 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
Judgment for government notwithstanding the verdict because Form 872-A extends the statute
of limitations for an indefinite period, and does not require the government to assess deficiencies
within a reasonable period of time.
6. DeSantis v. United States, 783 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A Form
906 closing agreement does not terminate a Form 872-A indefinite extension. The closing
agreement provided that the taxes in question may be assessed" on or before the expiration of
one year following the 5/1/85 date on which the decision of the controlling case became final;
the statutory notice was mailed on 12/13/89 and the assessment was made on 5/11/90. Held,
the means of termination specified in the Form 872-A consents are exclusive.
7. L & H Co. v. United States, 963 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1992). Taxpayers
presented no evidence other than their own testimony that they mailed their late 1981 tax return
on 9/4/82, so no claim for refund of taxes allegedly overpaid for 1981 was timely filed; alleged
telephone contacts with 20 different IRS employees in 1984 and 1985 did not turn up a single
employee who remembered speaking with taxpayers.
8. Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992). Taxpayer's
testimony that she mailed and saw the postal clerk postmark her return (together with an affidavit
from the friend who drove with her to the post office and waited in the car) was sufficient
evidence for thee common law presumption that her timely mailed federal income tax return was
delivered to the IRS; the presumptions in § 7502 do not replace the common law rule. Wood
v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1155 (8th Cir. 1990), followed.
9. Galuska v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. No. 45 (1992). Forms 4868 and
2688 applications for extension do not constitute "returns" in order for taxpayer to receive an
overpayment of his 1986 tax where no Form 1040 was filed for that year within the § 6511(b)
[3-year or 2-year] period for filing a claim for refund.
10. Green v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1992). The expiration
of the § 6501 period of limitations as to S corporations does not preclude the Commissioner from
assessing deficiencies attributable to the disallowance of losses passed through from the S
corporations to shareholders whose tax years were still open. Fehilaber v. Commissioner, 954
F.2d 653 (1 1th Cir. 1992), and Bufferd v. Commissioner, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992), followed.
11. Scheidt v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1992).
Misaddressed notice of deficiency [P.O. Box 20711 vice 20748] tolled the statute of limitations
even though it was not actually received by taxpayers until 21 days after the limitations period
expired, but 63 days before taxpayers were required to file a Tax Court petition.
F. Miscellaneous
1. Russo v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 28 (1992). Taxpayer wife's motion
to amend the petition to add an innocent spouse claim was denied because it was untimely raised
and because London Option loss deduction was not "grossly erroneous" under § 6013(e)(2) [in
that it was sanctioned initially by private letter rulings, although finally found to be not intended"
by the relevant Code sections].
2. Ness v. Commissioner, 954 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1992), revyg 94 T.C.
784 (1990). Innocent spouse relief awarded for that part of a $103,000 deduction that exceeded
the $35,000 amount that was at risk. The court found that the impermissible $68,000 excess
amount could be and was grossly erroneous" (i.e., lacked a basis in law) even though the
$35,000 part of the deduction was allowable.
3. Diamond v. United States, 944 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991). In affirming
summary judgment for defendant in § 7431 damage action by physician, held that IRS agent did
not unlawfully disclose return information in violation of § 6103 when he identified himself in
a circular letter to patients as a member of the Criminal Investigation Division because the IRS's
interpretation of § 6103 [so directing special agents to identify themselves] was made in good
faith, albeit erroneously.
4. Vahlco Corp. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 428 (1991). Texas
corporation, whose charter was forfeited for failure to file franchise tax report and pay taxes, and
which, therefore, lacked capacity to sue in Texas courts, lacked capacity to bring an action in
Tax Court.
5. Levitt v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 437 (1991). Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction over wife where she did not sign, nor authorize her husband to sign on her behalf,
the joint Tax Court petition in the instant case. The court refused to rule on the effect of her not
signing the spouses' joint tax returns and the powers of attorney, or on the validity of the notice
of deficiency. Husband took no formal position on his wife's motions, and testified that "I took
it for granted that my job was to do the financing and her job was to take care of my home."
6. Stauffacher v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 453 (1991). The Tax Court has
jurisdiction to redetermine the interest assessed on deficiencies it has found, but taxpayers failed
to show that the Commissioner's calculation was incorrect.
7. Allison v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 541 (1991). The automatic stay on
a Tax Court case is terminated when the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or a discharge is
granted or denied; it is not reimposed on the reopening of the bankruptcy case (absent an order
from the bankruptcy court).
8. Meyer v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 555 (1991). Tax Court lacks
jurisdiction on § 6651 and § 6654 penalties based on taxes computed and shown due (but not
paid) on delinqueatly filed returns because such additions are not subject to the deficiency
procedures.
9. Friedman v- Commissioner, 97 T.C. 606 (1991). Innocent spouse relief
is available where the "grossly erroneous items" are attributable to a jointly filed Form 1045
(Application for Tentative Refund).
10. Plumb v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 632 (1991). Taxpayers attempted to
elect to relinquish the NOL carryback period under § 172(b)(3) for regular tax purposes, but not
for alternative minimum tax purposes. The election was invalid because this option is not
available by reason of the existence of only one NOL carryback period that applies for both
regular and AMT purposes.
11. Baldwin v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 704 (1991). Tax Court has
jurisdiction [for the 1985 year] over a disallowed Form 1045 NOL carryback application because
the amount credited against taxpayers' unpaid 1985 taxes as a result of a tentative carryback
adjustment for a 1987 NOL constituted a "rebate" for deficiency purposes. (Commissioner
issued statutory notices for 1985 and 1987, and taxpayers petitioned only for 1985; the 1985
deficiency was the result of disallowance of a 1987 bad debt deduction that gave rise to the
NOL.)
12. Magee v. United States, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 50,063 (1991). Flora "full
payment" rule is satisfied and court has jurisdiction where taxes and penalties were paid even
though $23,000 in interest for which government had counterclaimed had not been paid.
13. Abruzzo v. United States, 92-1 U.S.T.C. 160,094 (1991). Complaint
for refund dismissed for failure to follow the full payment rule set forth in Flora v. United
States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958), adhered to 362 U.S. 145, rehearing denied 362 U.S. 972 (1960).
14. Proposed regulations (IA-54-90) under § 468B, relating to (a) the tax
treatment of transfers to certain escrow accounts, settlement funds, etc., (b) the taxation of
income earned by these funds, and (c) the tax treatment of distributions made by these funds
(F.R 2/14/92).
15. Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992), rev'g 911 F.2d 1539
(11 th Cir. 1990). Trustee appointed to liquidate substantially all of corporate debtors' property
(which had been transferred into the trust pursuant to a bankruptcy chapter 11 plan) and to
distribute the proceeds to creditors was required to file income tax returns and pay taxes because
he was an "assignee" under § 6012(b)(3). He was similarly required to file returns and pay taxes
with respect to income attributable to the trust property originally owned by an individual
bankrupt under § 6012(b)(4) because he was the fiduciary" of a trust." The United States, as
creditor, was not precluded by the failure of the chapter 11 plan to require the trustee to pay
taxes because creditors are not bound by such plans with respect to post confirmation claims.
16. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992) (7 judges
dissenting), rv3e~g 915 F.2d 1049 (6th Cir. 1991). Sovereign immunity precludes the trustee in
bankruptcy of solvent corporation from recovering from the United States funds withdrawn by
a corporate officer and used to discharge his own individual federal tax liability.
17. T.D. 8403, 1992-17 1.R.B. 10, final regulations under § 7811, relating
to the issuance of taxpayer assistance orders, 57 Fed. Reg. 9975 (1992).
18. T.D. 8413, 1992-23 I.R.B. 13, final regulations under § 6402(d), relating
to the tax refund offset program under which a tax overpayment is reduced by the amount of
past-due nontax debts owed to any federal agency 57 Fed. Reg. 13,035 (1992).
19. Kroh v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383 (1992) (reviewed, 2 judges
dissenting). Compromise settlement of bankrupt husband's joint return tax liabilities does not
operate to preclude Commissioner from litigating the full amount of wife's alleged tax
deficiencies and penalty additions to tax.
20. United States v. Bailey, 789 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Tex. 1992). Husband
and wife were permanently enjoined under § 7407 from acting as income tax preparers because
they repeatedly and willfully understated their clients' tax liabilities, the court's opinion setting
forth 39 fact situations.
21. Devore v. Commissioner, 963 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'g and
remanding 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 715 (1989). Remanded for evidentiary hearing to determine if
taxpayer was prejudiced by his former counsel's conflict of interest in the dual representation of
taxpayer and his exwife that prevented the former counsel from raising [§ 6013(e)] innocent
spouse and agency defenses on his behalf.
22. H Graphics/Access. Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M.
(CCH) 3148 (1992). Limited partner who executed Form 870-P ("Settlement Agreement for
Partnership Adjustments") but who changed the adjustment figures on the form (by deleting them
with correction fluid and typing in new numbers with adjustments equal to 10% of original
adjustments) and sent the form to the Service Center did not improperly induce the IRS to enter
into the agreement. The IRS argued that the form submitted by taxpayer was deceptive because
the changed adjustment figures were not highlighted or noted in the letter attached to the form.
However, the form referred to itself as an offer by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer's lawyer
testified he believed the form could be changed to make a settlement offer. Huene v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 456, and Herschler v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1475
distinguished.
23. Powerstein v. Comm., 99 T.C. No. 22 (1992). The Tax Court enjoins
assessment of tax shown on amended returns filed for years pending before the Court.
IX. TAX SHELTERS
1. Corra Resources. Ltd. v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1991).
Taxpayer who invested in a sham coal mining venture [the Pikeville Quadrangle lease] was not
entitled to a § 165(a) abandonment deduction for the $77,500 cost of the mining lease by reason
of its not taking any step that irrevocably cut its ties to the asset because mentally walk[ing] away.
from the investment" was not enough and taxpayer should not be permitted to hedge its bets by
reaping the benefits should mining commence. (Taxpayer's accountant concluded that something
was fishy when the IRS notice was the first product to emerge from the Pikeville Quadrangle. ")
2. Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1991), aff Ames v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1470 (1990). Program for timeshare unit purchases for
inflated prices lacked economic substance and constituted a "sham." The court both distinguished
and refused to follow Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir.
1988), preferring instead to follow the Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th
Cir. 1976), line of cases.
3. Cannon v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1991), aff' 59
T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1990). Affirmed Tax Court's disallowance of losses on Mexican gold and
silver mining venture under § 183 despite neither party's having explicitly raised that Code
section because § 183 is interrelated with §§ 162 and 212, which were raised.
4. Emershaw v, Commissioner, 949 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1991) (2-1), affg
59 T.C.M. (CCH) 621. Taxpayers were at risk for their pro rata share of a partially recourse
note issued in connection with a computer sale-leaseback transaction despite the transaction
having involved a circle of offsetting obligations recorded only on bookkeeping entries because
(1) the transaction is not a § 465(b)(4) loss-limiting arrangement and (2) the taxpayers were
ultimately at risk. The dissent in Baldwin v. Commissioner, 904 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1990), was
followed by the majority.
5. HGA Cinema Trust v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 1357 (7th Cir. 1991).
In O.P.M. equipment leasing transactions, partnership long-term promissory notes were not valid
indebtedness.
6. Gard v. United States, 92-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,159 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
Attorney who wrote an opinion used without his knowledge in connection with an abusive
computer software tax shelter, but lacked actual knowledge that the software was overvalued,
was not subject to the § 6701 aiding and abetting understatement penalty. However, there is a
fact issue with respect to the § 6700 penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters because that
section requires only that he knew or should have known that false or fraudulent statements were
made in connection with his participation in the tax shelter.
7. Nickerson v. Commissioner, 962 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1992), aff 58
T.C.M. (CCH) 826 (1989). Research and development tax shelter § 174 deductions were
disallowed under the two-step "generic tax shelter" and "economic substance" test from Rose v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386 (1987), gftd, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989), because of lack of
non-tax profit motive. Penalties under §§ 6661 and 6653(a), as well as § 6621(c) increased
interest, affirmed.
8. Horn v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'g and
remanding Fox v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CC-) 863 (1988). Section 108 of the Tax
Reform Act of 19 permits commodities dealers to deduct straddle losses even if the transactions
were "economic shams," i.e., devoid of any economic substance and designed only to produce
tax benefits, because the amended statute created an irrebuttable presumption that the trades were
made while engaged in a trade or business. (These were the same type of "London options"
transactions as described in Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986).) This creates a
conflict with the Second and Third Circuits.
9. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1992). Interest
accrued on 30-year balloon nonrecourse debt incurred to purchase overvalued timeshare units was
not deductible because the transaction was a sham. Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir. 1991), followed.
10. Estate of Wallace v. Commissioner, 965 F.2d 1038 (11 th Cir. 1992).
Physician involved in cattle feeding business (in commercial feedlots) could not deduct the cost
of prepaid cattle feed in the year purchased because under § 464 he was a "limited entrepreneur"
who did not "actively participate" in the management of the cattle-feeding enterprise, i.e., he had
no control over how the commercial feedlots were operated.
11. Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. No. 7 (1992). Enhanced oil recovery
limited partnership activities were not engaged in with actual and honest profit objectives.
X. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
1. Temporary and proposed regulations (T.D. 8365, 1991-2 C.B. 373;
IA-224-82) under § 3406(a)(1)(B), relating to backup withholding due to notification of an
incorrect taxpayer identification number (56 Fed. Reg. 47, 904 (1991)). See also Rev. Proc.
91-58, 1991-2 C.B. 841, for guidelines on how to stop backup withholding under Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 35a.3406-1(f).
2. T.D. 8409, 1992-19 I.R.B. 28, final regulations under § 3406(a)(1)(B),
relating to backup withholding after notification of an incorrect name/TIN combination, 57 Fed.
Reg. 13,028 (1992). See also Rev. Proc. 92-32, 1992-17 I.R.B. 22.
3. Proposed regulations (IA-28-91) under § 6302, relating to the
simplification of employment tax deposit system (57 Fed. Reg. 21,043 (1992) (to be codified at
26 I.F.R. § 31.6302). Provides for semi-weekly (over $12,000) or monthly ($12,000 or less)
deposits, where the "one-day" rule ($100,000 or more) is inapplicable.
XI. TRUSTS. ESTATES & GIFTS
1. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. United States, 937 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1991),
on remand 92-1 U.S.T.C. 60,102 (D. Conn. 1992). Decedent's estate was entitled to use a
stepped-up basis (determined as of the later death of decedent's wife) for purposes of computing
the estate's capital gain on the sale of stock held by the estate as marital trust property for
decedent's wife (but not yet distributed to the marital trust at the time of wife's death) because
the uniform basis rule of Treas. Reg. 1. § 1014(a)(1) requires this result. On remand, the
district court granted government's summary judgment motion with "duty-bound distaste."
2. LTR 9230021. See, "Use Of Grantor Trust Avoids 1041 When Property With Debt
In Excess Of Basis To Go To Spouse, "Letter Ruling Review, Sept. 1992 (attached).
3. LTR 9222012. See, "Grantor Trust's Capital Losses Don't Pass Thru To
Beneficiaries," June, 1992 (attached).
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LETTER RULING REVIEW
Hog Farmer's Transfer Of Hogs To
Wife As Compensation For Work
Makes Her Eligible For IRA
Deduction
While it is true that income from the operation of a
farm may be eligible for an IRA deduction (§ 219), on
the ground that it is compensatory in nature (see
§ 401(c)(2)), the ability to make a deductible IRA con-
tribution will be available only to the individual tax-
payer that works the farm. Assume, for example that
husband and wife own farm property but that a hog
farm operation on that property is operated by the hus-
band alone. In LTR 9202003 the wife performed ser-
vices in connection with the hog farm operation and, in
order to provide her with "compensation" eligible for
making an IRA contribution the husband "paid" her, in
kind, by giving her hogs with a value of $2,000 which
she soon sold on the market for at or about that amount
(all of which was duly reported to the IRS on a Form
W-2 issued to the wife). The husband took a deduction
on the Schedule F for the value of the hogs ("farm
labor" ) but did not include any amount in income at-
tributable to the sale of the hogs. Although the wife
reported the income from the sale of the hogs as "other
income" that inclusion was shielded by a correspond-
ing IRA deduction. In opining on these events the IRS
approved all of the above except it noted that the
husband's transfer of the hogs (zero basis in his hands
since their cost had been expensed) would have been a
gain realizing event to the husband (properly includible
on Sch. F). Although not specifically observed this
would have given the hogs an FMV basis in the wife's
hands with the result that their sale by her on the
market would generate no gain. The receipt of the hogs
would still be "compensation" to the wife, the IRS con-
firmed, permitting her to take an IRA deduction. Thus
when the dust settles on the entire transaction their is
no net inclusion in the couple's tax base--the Sch. F in-
clusion is offset by the deduction for compensation and
the comoensatorv income received by the wife can be
offset by a deduction for an IRA contribution. This
result was reached without any IRS consideration of
1041 which excludes from income transfers between
husband and wife (including income arising from the
sale or exchange of property by one to the other).
MARCH 1992
Failure To Honor Niceties Causes
Farmer To Lose Deduction For
Rental Payments To Spouse
Transactions between husband and wife in a farm
context have been the subject of recent scrutiny by the
IRS. See, "'Hog Farmer's Transfer Of Hogs To Wife As
Compensation For Work Makes Her Eligible For IRA
Deduction," Letter Riding Review. Feb. 1992, p. 1. In
LTR 9206008 the burden of self-employment taxes
prompted the husband to seek to deduct rent (in deter-
mining net income from self-employment) paid to his
spouse for the use of her interest in jointly held farm
property. Since rental payments between spouses for the
use of property are otherwise deductible (including for
purposes of determining net income from self-employ-
ment under §1402(a)), all of this should have passed
muster except for the taxpayers' failure to honor the
niceties. For example, the husband deducted on the
Schedule F the full amount of the interest on the
mortgage on the farm property and in one of the years
the full amount of the property taxes (whereas consisten-
cy would have required the husband's spouse to claim,
probably on her Schedule E, those deductions attributable
her one-half interest in the property). Therefore, for pur-
poses of computing deductions attributable to interest and
taxes, the husband treated the entire farm property as
used in the farming business whereas for purposes of
claiming rental deductions one-half of the property was
treated as belonging to the wife. While it is possible,
therefore, to reduce self-employment income, when joint-
ly held property is involved, by a rental arrangement be-
tween spouses, the "price" for such a tactic would be
giving up that portion of the "other" deductions at-
tributable to the lessor spouse's one-half interest (which
may not make the effort worth the candle).
FEBRUARY 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Passive Loss Disallowed For AMT
May Not Be Carried Back To
Pre-Enactment Year
While there was a phase-in following the 1986 Act
for the limitation on the deductibility of passive losses
(§33 469) such was not the case as respects the alterna-
tive minimum tax (AMT). Thus, in 1987, the first year
in which the passive loss rules would be applicable, no
amount of passive loss would be deductible in deter-
mining the a taxpayer's AMT liability (although 65 per-
cent of the loss would have been deductible in deter-
mining regular tax liability). In LTR 9152004 the tax-
payer (who had a 1987 passive loss) took the position
that since § 469 is prospective only (applying only to
post-1986 years) that such loss could be carried back to
1986 and used in calculating the NOL for AMT pur-
poses in that year. In nipping this effort in the bud the
IRS relied upon the principle that it is the law in effect
in the year in which the loss is incurred (1987 in this
case) that determines its deductibility (not the law ap-
plying to the year in which the loss is to be carried
back). Thus, since none of the loss was useable in 1987
(because of § 58(b)(2)) none could be carried back to a
pre-1987 year. However, if the regular income tax
were involved, instead of the AMT, 65 percent of the
taxpayer's 1987 loss could be carried back for regular
income tax purposes since that amount-of the loss
would have been allowed in 198,7 pursuant to the
phase-in rules. § 469(m).
JUNE 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Physical Abandonment Of Nuclear
Plant Not Necessary to Secure
Abandonment Loss
The IRS' regulations regarding abandonment losses
seem to convey the meaning that there must be an ac-
tual physical giving up of the property before a tax
loss will be justified. A "mere intention to abandon"
without a "relinquishment of possession and control"
will not be sufficient. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8(a)(4). In LTR
9220003 it appears, however, that these words, in
some instances, might not apply with full force. Al-
though the taxpayer had previously received letter
rulings from the IRS approving the taking of an aban-
donment loss regarding a nuclear-powered electric
generating plant it had constructed, this plan had been
postponed until 1989 when the loss was actually
claimed. While the taxpayer had, at that time, applied
for a "possession only license" from the regulatory
commission, the property nonetheless remained in the
taxpayer's possession and under a "full power license"
from that body. Backtracking from a hard and fast
"bright-line," and upholding the 1989 deduction, the
IRS concluded that the "act necessary to evidence the
intent to abandon property need only be appropriate to
the particular circumstances." In this instance, recog-
nizing just how hard nuclear plants are to abandon
("...the taxpayer can not simply walk away from the
property"), the IRS was satisfied that the taxpayer "has
consistently acted in such a manner to manifest its in-
tent to abandon...". Thus, it was sufficient that the tax-
payer had prepared a plan for decommissioning and
that it was in fact preparing for decommissioning. Ac-
tual physical abandonment was not necessary in this
case.
APRIL 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Transfer Of Crops To Spouse
Doesn't Avoid SE Income But This
May Not Always Be So
The burdensome nature of the self-employment tax
has placed a premium on ingenuity in this area. Of late
taxpayers in farming activity seem to have been seeking
ways in which to lessen the impact of this tax which now
sits at a 15.3 percent level. For example, in LTR
9206008 the IRS concluded that a farmer could not
deduct, in determining self-employment income, rent
paid to his wife for the use of farm property. More
recently, in LTR 9210004, the taxpayer husband trans-
ferred grain to his spouse under circumstances where it
was sold by local grain elevator and the proceeds
remitted to her. While she reported the income from the
grain (as capital gain on Sch. D because it was not inven-
tory to her) the income therefrom was omitted from the
Sch. F filed with the taxpayers' joint return thereby
reducing the amount subject to the SE tax. In view of the
fact that the IRS could not really attack the transfer of
zero basis crops on anticipatory assignment of income
principles (having long since conceded that issue, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223) it had to approach
the issue from another tact. Left without much law on its
side, and plainly not liking the taxpayer's objective, the
IRS was forced to rely upon factual deficiencies, and
several missteps were made, in its adverse ruling. First,
there was a hint that the transfer was compensatory in
nature (there being some indication that the transfer was
made to "reward" the donee for her services on the
farm). (If this were the case, although LTR 9210004 does
not so state, the transfer of the grain would have been a
gain realizing event to the donor and hence SE income.)
Second, there was an indication that the husband never
really departed with the grain (he having been listed as
the "patron" on the elevator deposit document). Thirdly,
the IRS noted that the transferee spouse may have never
received the grain itself but rather the deposit document
which, it was observed. may have been the equivalent of
cash (a notion which appears to be a stretch since the
deposit document itself would not result in income to the
donor). In sum, though. the IRS relied upon its con-
clusion (which seems based on the facts of this particular
case and does not announce what should be a general
rule) that the entire transaction appeared to be premised
on tax avoidance grounds. To be sure interspousal trans-
fers are likely to be more rigorously examined but it
would seem plain that even if the SE tax cannot be
avoided in that context that more careful taxpayers
should be able to do so when the crop is transferred to a
family member other than a spouse. See, e.g., Harris,
When is Grain a Capital Asset?," 30 South Dakota L.
Rev. 275 (1985).
AUGUST 1992
LET'TER RULING REVIEW
Crop Transfer Again Fails To
Reduce SE Tax Burden
In LTR 9229002 another farming couple tried to
avoid the self-employment tax burden by transferring
crops raised on the jointly held farm from the farmer
husband to the non-farming spouse. The stratagem was
to have the transferee spouse then sell the crops and
report the gain thereon off Sch. F (thereby removing
it from the tax base subject to the SE tax). Just as in a
prior holding (See, "Transfer Of Crops To Spouse
Doesn't Avoid SE Income But This May Not Always
Be So," Letter Ruling Review, April, 1992, p. 1) the
IRS held in LTR 9229002 that the crop transfer from
the husband to his spouse lacked "economic sub-
stance" and was not, therefore, a valid gift. Here, how-
ever, just as in the prior situation, the underlying facts
militated against a finding that an effective gift was
made. Instead of making it a clear transfer in which
the donee spouse had full dominion over the trans-
ferred property, the proceeds from the crop sale were
deposited to a joint account (thereby allowing the IRS
to conclude that the donor received a substantial
economic benefit from the transfer). Further, the grain
elevator deposits were not handled in a way in which
it was possible to say that the donee spouse has "unfet-
tered control" of the crop. Also, there was indication
that a motivation for the transfer was the lowering of
the couple's state income tax burden (i.e., to increase
the donee's income so that she could file a separate
state income tax return and lower their aggregate income
tax liability). Although all of these circumstances came
together to compel the conclusion that no effective gift
had been made, it would seem that a properly handled
transfer (without factual deficiencies of the type noted
above) could carry the day and result in obtaining the
donor's SE tax objective . Cf., Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459
(1954); Eswe qf W.G. Farrier, 15 T.C. 277 (1950).
NOVEMBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Universities Can Avoid UBI From
Athletic Program Advertising
Whether program advertising for university athletic
events generates UBI is a difficult issue for the IRS.
True, it is still fighting the "regularly carried on" issue.
For advertising income to be UBI it must be from a
trade or business activity regularly carried on by the or-
ganization. Reg. § 1.513-1(a). See, e.g., "Real Difficul-
ty Exists In Avoiding UBI Tax On Program Advertis-
ing," Letter Ruling Review, Oct. 1989, p. 3. Even
though the Commissioner lost NCAA v. Comm., 66
AFTR 2d 90-5602 (10th Cir. 1990), which held that
"regularly carried on" requires an examination of the
time span of the event to which the advertising relates
rather than the time necessary to sell and place the ads,
the IRS has shown no indication it will follow that
thinking. In LTR 9137002 the ads involved were
placed in the football program for a major university's
three-month football season (admittedly a longer time
span than the several day NCAA tournament). The pro-
gram advertising was placed in two ways. The main
center and cover places were sold by a national adver-
tising agency. The bulk of the advertising was sold,
however, by the publisher of the proceeds who, under
its agreement with the university, was permitted to
keep the proceeds of some 60 pages of ads as compen-
sation for its preparation of the program which was
sold to the university for x cents per copy. LTR
9137002 wrestles with whether the university had UBI
as a result of both types of advertising. Conceding that
the university had no actual income from the publisher
itself, the IRS still saw the possibility that it had im-
puted income in that the finished programs were sold
to the university at less than their fair market value.
Despite this analysis the IRS couldn't get over the fact
that the university paid, rather than received, amounts
to the publisher. Thus, organizations such as that in-
volved in LTR 9137002 can sidestep substantial
amounts of UBI by receiving their "value" in the form
of a reduced price for the publication of the program.
If, however, the university reserves some ot the choice
advertising for itself (as it did in LTR 9137002) the
IRS will find UBI (although certainly the organization
could contest that finding in court relying upon the
holding in NCAA).
NOVEMBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Exempt Org's Newsletter Doesn't
Produce UBI, But Ads Do
When exempt organizations publish newsletters or
similar items the UBI issues raised generally revolve
around income generated by the publication itself and
income from advertising. The first, as LTR 9137049
shows, is relatively easy to solve. There an exempt or-
ganization formed to educate inventors published a
monthly newsletter containing articles on various in-
ventors and the work they do as well as a listing of
newly issued patents. Financial necessity compelled im-
posing a small charge ($10 per year) for the publication
once distributed free and set the stage for a determina-
tion of whether this charge resulted in UBI. Consider-
ing the relationship between the publication and the
organization's exempt purpose it was not difficult for it
to conclude that the publication contributed "important-
ly" to the accomplishment of the organization's exempt
purpose. Another part of the publication-a listing of
business services to inventors--and the decision to im-
pose a $50 per year charge upon those listed raised a
more pesky issue. The Service's front line position(reflected in Rev. Rul. 82-139, 1982-2 C.B. 108, in-
volving ads in a bar association journal) is that income
from commercial ads in a publication otherwise related
to the org's exempt purpose does produce UBI. There
is, though, a willingness to treat such income as not
productive of UBI if the ads are likely to produce only
a negligible commercial benefit to the organization. In
LTR 9137049 the IRS concluded that the advertisers in
the inventor's newsletter, under the heading "Business
Services Offered," do receive a commercial benefit
and, therefore, UBI results. In LTR 9044071 (see,
"Small Ads in Programs Book Don't Generate UBI
But Larger Ones Do," Letter Ruling Review, Jan. 199 1,
p. 4), on the other hand, the IRS showed a willingness,
based solely on size (i.e.. 48-per page or smaller) to
conclude that no UBI resulted.
APRIL 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Ad Income Is UBI, As Usual, But
Per American College, May Not
Always Be
In the world after the Supreme Court's decision in
U.S. v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834
(1986), the opening for advertising income to avoid clas-
sification as unrelated business income is narrow indeed.
The Court's opinion in that case did, however, by refus-
ing to accept the government's urging that advertising in-
come is per se UBI, provide a clearly marked path for
the classification of advertising income as other than
UBI. Although the IRS did not follow that path in LTR
9211004 it, at least, admitted its existence. An organiza-
tion (exempt pursuant to § 501(c)(3)), appearing to be
much like a high school level NCAA, publishes a
magazine for athletic administrators. Aside from articles
of interest to its readership, the publication contained ad-
vertisements for services and goods related to the ad-
ministration of high school athletics (e.g.. materials to
mark lines on the field). Although this situation was quite
close to the medical products advertised in the journal
which was involved in American College (found to result
in UBI), and thus, was not within the opening which ex-
ists for avoidance of UBL Although the IRS found that
the ads did not meet the "stringent standards for related-
ness" promulgated by the Supreme Court the IRS at least
recognized the existence of such standards. For example,
if there had been a "comprehensive or systematic presen-
tation of any aspect of the goods or services publicized."
such as would have been designed to present an en-
cyclopedic listing, the way may have been open to
avoidance of UBI, Suffice it say that while the IRS found
that here the ads were not essentially different from
"commercial advertising" the IRS at least recognizes that
this may not always be the case.
MARCH 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Only Membership Dues Considered
In Determining UBI From
Advertising Income
The determination of unrelated business income from
advertising ranks up there as one of the most difficult
computations that may have to be made under the tax
law. See, Reg. §l.512(a)-I(f). If the advertising income
represents UBI (and it usually does) the organization is
entitled (per Reg. §1.512(a)-I(d)(2)) to allocate an ap-
propriate amount of the costs attributable to production
and distribution to the advertising side (as distinct from
the circulation side). If, after this allocation, the organiza-
tion has excess advertising income (Reg. § 1.512(a)-
l(f)(2)(ii)) it has, of course, a clear exposure to a tax on
UBI. If, however, expenses exceed circulation income
(defined Reg. §1.512(a)-l(f)(3)(iii)) then the excess of
such expenses over income is available to reduce UBI.
Assume, for example, that an organization has, with
respect to a publication related to its exempt purpose, cir-
culation income of $60,000 and offsetting expenses of
$70,000 (resulting in net circulation income of ($10,000))
and gross advertising income of $40,000 with offsetting
allocable expenses of $20,000. The ability to use the
($10,000) loss in circulation income to further offset net
income from advertising, reduces UBI to $10,000 rather
than the $20,000 it would otherwise have been. This
creates an incentive (and this was the issue in LTR
9204007) to reduce that Portion of the income that would
be considered circulation income with the result that it
would be more likely that there would be a loss in cir-
culation income that would be useable to reduce UBI.
Where the right to the publication is included in the dues
paid by the organization's membership, circulation in-
come includes an allocable portion of membership
receipts. In LTR 9204007 the organization had other
sources of income (e.g., investment income, special pro-
gram revenues, state convention fees, income from the
sale of books and members' contributions to the
organization's PAC) and sought a holding from the IRS
that none of the income from these other sources would
be considered in determining the portion of membership
receipts allocable to the periodical. Thus, only member-
ship dues (and even there only that portion allocable to
the periodical) would be considered in the determination
of circulation income making it more likely that the ex-
cess over income can be used to further reduce the in-
come subject to the tax on UBI.
AUGUST 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
IRS Refusal To Apply Economic
Unit Test In Denial Of Section 1033
Appears Questionable
The single-economic-unit rule, when applicable, per-
mits a taxpayer to obtain section 1033 non-recognition
ureatment when a second asset has to be sold as result of
the involuntary conversion of a first piece of property.
Thus, in Harry G. Masser, 30 T.C. 741 (1958), when a
group of parking lots were taken by condemnation, the
taxpayer was allowed tax-free rollover on the sale of an
adjacent terminal building to a third party. The notion
was that the two pieces of property were acquired for,
and were being used as, a single economic unit. The
taxpayer was able to demonstrate that the continuation
of the business using only the remaining asset would
be impractical. In LTR 9227002 a stadium owned by
Partnership 1 (P1) was declared "blighted" by the city
as part of its plan to acquire the pro team whicih used
that facility (the teai being owned by Partnership 2
(P2)). When the team was acquired earlier the league
required that the family buy both the team and the
stadium in which the team played its home games. To
meet this requirement the acquiring family had PI
(owned 60 percent by the parents and 40 percent by
their children) acquire the stadium and P2 (owned 92
percent by an S corporation which itself was owned
by the family in the same ratio) acquire the team. The
stadium, as a result of the threatened condemnation.
was sold to the city by Pl. Since the stadium lease
had another seven years to run, and since the lease
terms gave the city no incentive to renegotiate the
lease, the family concluded it had to dispose of the
team as well (which P2 did by a sale to outside inves-
tors). The S corporation, being a 92 percent owner of
P2, asserted section 1033 protection, upon reinvest-
ment in property similar or related in service or use,
with respect to the gain from the sale of the team. Citing
two seemingly inapposite authorities (both involving
situations where the taxpayer had no economic interest in
the "related" property (i.e., Dorothy C. Thorpe Glass
Mfg. Corp., 51 T.C. 300 (1968); Rev. Rul. 69-53,
1969-1 C.B. 199), the IRS concluded that the lack of
an economic interest by P2 (or its partners) in the
stadium meant that the sale of the team by P2 was
ineligible for section 1033. This result seems subject
to appropriate challenge since it appears clear that the
individual owners of the S corp (the 92 percent partner
in P2) were the same individuals who comprised the
partnership which owned the stadium. Thus, the
owners of P2 did have an economic interest in the
stadium. Depending upon further development of the
facts this case appears, indeed, to be a likely candidate
for application of the single-economic-unit rule.
NOVEMBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
IRS Denies It Has Authority Under
§1033 To Extend Time for Election
There are circumstances in which a taxpayer would
conclude that it is best to pay the tax on the gain
generated by the involuntary conversion of property.
The regulations are clear that if the taxpayer elects in
the year of the involuntary conversion to report the
gain (caused, most often, by the receipt of insurance
proceeds), that that taxpayer can change its mind and
elect § 1033 nonrecognition as long as that decision is
made prior to the expiration of the period within which
the converted property must be replaced (generally,
two years after the close of the first taxable year in
which any part of the gain is realized). See. Reg. §
1. 1033(a)-2(c)(2). Even here. however, the regulations
permit, upon the showing of'reasonable cause," some
slippage in that provision is made to extend the time
for acquiring replacement property as long as the ap-
plication is made before the expiration of the two year
period. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(3). In LTR 9138002 the
taxpayer did not seek an expiration of the replacement
period but, rather, an extension of the period during
which an election could be made. Assume, for ex-
ample, a 1985 involuntary conversion and a decision to
report the gain in that year (prompted mainly by the
fact that the property was underinsured, resulting in a
less than anticipated gain). In 1987 some replacement
property was acquired but nowhere nearly large
enough to shield the entire gain. A suit against the in-
surance agent resulted in a subsequent settlement in
1988 and caused a reevaluation of the judgment not to
utilize § 1033. The question raised in LTR 9138002
was whether the taxpayer could apply to the IRS, based
upon reasonable cause, for an extension of time in
which to make the basic § 1033 election (as distinct
from seeking an extension of time in which to acquire
replacement property). Although the IRS firmly con-
cludes it will not extend the time for election under the
§ 1033 regs, it does not opine on whether the taxpayer
had potential recourse under Reg. § 1.9 100 which
grants general authority (based upon a showing of
"reasonable cause," which this taxpayer did not appear
to be without) to the IRS to extend the time for making
elections. See, e.g., "Extensions of Time to Make §911
Election Are Available But Not Always," Letter Ruling
Review, Nov. 1990, p. 6.
APRIL 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
IRS Denial Of 1033 Eligibility For
Hurricane Damage To Trees Is
Questionable
In other contexts the IRS has been more willing to
apply § 1033 when timber is destroyed by a hurricane.
See., e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-175, 1980-2 C.B. 230; "Timber
Owner's § 631 Gain Caused by 'Hugo' Eligible For
§ 1033," Letter Ruling Review, Sept., 1991, p. 3. In LTR
9209007, however, the IRS seems to take a wrong turn in
applying § 1033 to the destruction by Hurricane Hugo of
timber on property that was held not for timber cutting
purposes but in order to keep the property in a natural
state for the flora and wildlife on the acreage. After the
hurricane the taxpayer cut the damaged trees (in order to
allow restoration of the acreage) and sold the resulting
cut. The taxpayer intended to invest the income from that
transaction in adjacent timber property to be held in the
same manner. Since the taxpayer was not in the business
of logging there was no § 631 election in effect which
would have the effect of treating the cutting as a gain
realizing event. See, e.g., LTR 9131034. Relying upon
the notion that the taxpayer could have decided not to
sell the damaged trees (but simply allowed the forest
regeneration process to occur) the IRS concluded that
§ 1033 nonrecognition was not available. This holding
harks back to less enlightened times it appeared to be the
IRS position that § 1033 was not available if the
taxpayer's gain was generated by sale rather than the
receipt of insurance proceeds or damages. See, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 74-532, 1974-2 C.B. 270. It has been noted, though,
that this stance "is hard to justify...if the property is
damaged beyond repair and is sold for scrap as a prelude
to the acquisition of replacement property..." Bittker &
Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income Estate & Gifts,
44.3.211. This clearly seems to have been a situation
where the sale was the result of the partial destruction of
the property and that therefore § 1033 should apply. The
IRS seems on even weaker ground when it concludes that
the taxpayer is further ineligible for § 1033 because it
was not in the business of cutting timber but rather hold-
ing it in its natural state. The statute (§ 1033(a)) simply
requires that the property of the taxpayer be destroyed in
whole or in part. Unlike the unrepaired ship in C.G. Wil-
lis. 41 T.C. 468 (1964), which the IRS cites in support of
its position, the trees in question were not repairable but
destroyed. In other instances victims of Hugo received
better treatment from the IRS and this taxpayer deserves
the same.
SEPTEMBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Timber Owner's §6 3 1 Gain Caused
By 'Hugo' Eligible For §10 3 3
When property is involuntarily converted the realiza-
tion of gain is most frequently attributable to the
receipt of insurance proceeds. The gain so realized can
avoid recognition if the taxpayer purchases property
"similar or related in service and use" within the re-
quired time period. §§ 1033(a)(2)(A), (B). Timber
destroyed by a casualty event (e.g., Hurricane Hugo)
presents an unusual opportunity as LTR 9131034
demonstrates. Frequently, since large timber holdings
will not be insured against such a calamity there will
not be the conversion into cash as when insurance is
present. There is, nevertheless, compelled gain recogni-
tion to the timberholder if an election has been made
under §631 to treat the cutting of timber as the sale or
exchange of that asset. Since most large timberholders
will have made such an election (in order to obtain the
capital gain treatment) the question arises whether
§631 gain (measured by the excess of the FMV of the
cut tree over its basis) can be sheltered by reinvestment
in the requisite replacement property. LTR 9131034
answers this issue favorably to the taxpayer by conclud-
ing that § 1033 provides nonrecognition "[r]egardless
of whether the realization of gain or loss arises
from...the cutting of timber under §63 1(a)...or actual
sales..." The § 1033 reinvestment period will begin to
run in the year in which Hugo is deemed to have
resulted in the taxable event. Thus, since there may not
be an immediate conversion of the toppled trees into
salable logs, other sources of funds may have to be
used for the reinvestment. All that is fine and, as LTR
9131034 further announces, expenditures for reforesta-
tion, cleaning and clearing drainage systems, repairing
fences, gates and roads, all qualify as reinvestment in
property which is "similar or related in service and
use.,
JANUARY 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Imposition of Restrictions Can Result
in Involuntary Conversion
For property to be treated as involuntarily converted
(for § 1033 purposes) it is not necessary that it actually
be taken by, or transferred to, the governmental entity.
For example, in LTR 9148025 the city sought to impose
restrictions upon property, which was being used as a
mobile home park, under the flight path to the airport.
The city's intent was to prohibit the use of the land
(which was owned by the individual taxpayer and
leased to a corporation, also owned by that person, for
operation of the mobile home park) for residential pur-
poses. The city chose the route of imposing restrictions
rather than outright condemnation in order to minimize
the compensation payable to the taxpayer. The court
granted the city's application for possession and after
the business tenants on the property had been moved
out the underlying real property was returned to the in-
dividual taxpayer who then sold it a third party. The tax-
payer sought to use the proceeds from the third party
sale and the city's payment for the imposition of the
restrictions to acquire replacement property. The IRS
held that the city's restrictions constituted an involun-
tary conversion "notwithstanding the fact that the tax-
payers retain ownership of the land." It further held
that the "voluntary sale" of the land will be treated as
part of the involuntary conversion for purposes of
§1033.
SEPTEMBER 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Disclaimer, Causing Property To
Pass Directly, Identifies Party To
Make 1033 Election
It is only the owner of the property at the time of
the involuntary conversion that may elect not to recog-
nize gain under section 1033. If a condemnation
proceeding occurs after the death of the decedent it be-
comes important to focus in on just who (e.g., the es-
tate, a trust, or beneficiaries) is the proper party to
make the section 1033 election. In LTR 9232004
property was left by the decedent in trust for life to his
surviving spouse with remainder to their children.
After death, but during estate administration, the
spouse properly disclaimed (section 2518) her life in-
terest. Subsequent to the disclaimer the property was
sold (under threat of condemnation) to the county.
Who would be the proper party to elect section 1033
nonrecognition? The IRS held that due to the dis-
claimer the property is treated as having never been
transferred to the trust but, rather, as having passed
directly to the children (the trust's beneficiaries).
Under local law, as real property, the property is
treated as having passed directly, on the date of the
decedent's death, to the trust's beneficiaries. Accord-
ingly, the beneficiaries are the parties properly entitled
to elect section 1033. Thus, when real property passes
directly under local law, as is most often the case, it is
the persons to whom the 1roperty so passes that are
entitled to elect section 1033 nonrecognition. This is
so even when that occurs as a result of a disclaimer.
JULY 19)2
LETI'ER RULING REVIEW
Section 1033 Replacement Property
Can Be Acquired From Related
Party
If property is taken by. condemnation (or threat of
condemnation) the qualifying replacement property can
be like-kind rather than that falling within the more
narrow group defined as "similar or related in service
and use." In LTR 9224006 a first tier limited partner-
ship (B), 99 percent owned by T, which also owned
interests in two other limited partnerships (P. 80 per-
cent and C, 99 percent), acquired a 5.5 acre property
in an industrial area which it intended to use as a park-
ing lot. The property, which was located in an indus-
trial area abutting a newly completed jail, was sold to
the county for SX within two years of its acquisition. It
was assumed that the sale was under threat of con-
dennation (and the IRS did not deal with that issue).
The qualifying replacement property was acquired by
B from P and C ("sister related partnerships") thus
raising the issue of whether such an acquisition can
qualify for nonrecognition. Underlining that if the sale
took place at the fair market value of the replacement
property (in LTR 9224006 B represented that the sale
took place at a the FMV as determined by an inde-
pendent appraiser) the IRS concluded that there was no
obstacle to §1033 qualification. This holding is consis-
tent with Rev. Rul. 73-120, 1973-1 C.B. 369, although
in that holding the replacement property was acquired
from the selling corporation's owners whereas here the
property was acquired from another co-owned entity.
MAY 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Grant Of Easement Qualifies As
'Like-Kind' For 1031 Swap
It seems clear that the real property interest received
in a §1031 exchange (or for that matter purchased as a
result of an involuntary conversion eligible under
§1033(g)) need not be a fee interest in real property. For
example, under certain circumstances a leasehold or a
remainder interest in real property may qualify as -like-
kind." See, e.g., -Exchange of Remainder Interest in Real
Property for Fee Eligible for 1031," Letter Ruling
Review, Dec. 1991, p. 4. It appears to be simply the next
step to qualify an easement as well. In LTR 9215049 the
taxpayer granted an agricultural conservation easement
("less than fee simple") which had the effect or removing
the land from development for other than agricultural
production. Although the statute under which this was ac-
complished provided for grints for 25 years or in per-
petuity, this situation involved the latter and was ap-
proved by the IRS as being like-kind thereby permitting
the county to transfer to the taxpayer a fee simple interest
in improved or unimproved reality in a qualifying §1031
exchange. It should be observed that this would be the
result even if the easement grant involved the retention
by the grantor of recreational rights (or rights to maintain
fences, roads, etc.). See. Rev. Rul. 72-549. 1972-2 C.B.
472.
JUNE 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Donor Gets Current Charitable
Deduction Even Though Property Is
Actually Transferred In Later Period
One can easily envision a situation where a donor
seeks to make a charitable contribution of tangible
property (typically artwork) but the donee is not yet
ready to receive the property (e.g.. the museum that is
to house the property is not yet complete or is other-
wise incapable of receiving the property). In such a
situation must the donor's eligibility for an income tax
charitable deduction wait upon the ability of the donee
to actually take possession of the property? This was
the situation in LTR 9218067 where the donor, al-
though executing a deed to the contributed property,
retained possession of the property (in fact, the proper-
ty continued to be displayed in the donor's home) until
a later year in which the museum was actually open.
While such a situation raises the specter of the transfer
of a future interest rather than a present interest, the
IRS focused on the effectiveness of the deed to trans-
fer a present interest at local law. Finding this to be
the case, it was far easier for the IRS to conclude, as it
did, that a present interest was conveyed and that the
taxpayer was entitled to a full fair market value
charitable deduction. Cf., Reg. § 1.170A-5(a)(4). It was
the ability of the donee museum to take possession of
the property if it chose to do so that was significant.
Although the IRS pointed out that the donee did have
storage space that it could have used for the property
pending completion of the museum, there is no real
indication that this element was essential to the result.
What was essential was the "understanding...of the
parties [that there was not] a tacit reservation by the
donor of a present right of possession."
JANUARY 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Charitable Contribution of
Nondepreciable Musical Instrument
Results in Full Tax Benefit
The IRS's position on art works used in a business
context is that they are nondepreciable property, be-
cause in the Service's view it is not possible to deter-
mine their useful life. Thus art work displayed in a
doctor's office may not be depreciable for this reason.
The same would be true of a very old musical instru-
ment (e.g., a violin or cello); despite the fact that this
asset constitutes the tool of the taxpayer's trade, his or
her investment therein cannot be recovered through an
allowance for depreciation. As LTR 9147049
demonstrates, though, the gift of the ancient musical in-
strument to charity works without a hitch. First, since
the instrument is a capital asset (and it is, not by reason
of § 1231 (b), but, rather, by reason of § 1221), there
would be no reduction, per § 170(e)(I)(A), in the
amount of the charitable deduction. Second, there is no
further reduction in the FMV charitable deduction if
the use of the contributed property is related to the
organization's exempt function (as it was in LTR
9147049- an educational organization that maintained
an instrument bank). While the capital gain nature of
the contributed property would limit the deduction to
30% of AGI (§ 170(b)(I)(C)(i)) this potential disad-
vantage is outweighed by the eligibility of the property
for the exclusion of tangible personal property from the
AMT base-an exclusion which has been extended
until June 30, 1992. Thus, even though the possessor of
an invaluable musical instrument is unable to
depreciate the property, its contribution to charity can
result in full tax benefits.
DECEMBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
In Shift, IRS Holds On-Site Meals
for Employees Ineligible for §119
Exclusion
Although the nature of the company involved in
LTR 9143003 is not identified it is not hard to imagine
the type of business it is in. One could contemplate a
suburban office complex too remote for its employees
to obtain their lunches off-site. Most of the employees
do their work on the telephone and a rush in such calls
is experienced in the mornings and afternoons with
some decrease in such traffic during the 11:00 am. to
1:00 p.m. period. Since, however, the office does busi-
ness across the country it is important to maintain a
high level of capability to respond to telephone in-
quiries at all times during the day. Because of this need
the company has made a practice of limiting employee
lunch periods to 30 or 35 minutes and to provide on
site free lunches. Although the IRS once issued a
favorable ruling excluding such meals under § 119, in
LTR 9143003 it backs away from a carte blanche posi-
tion of § 119 qualification in such situations. The regs
make clear that meals will be provided for the "con-
venience of the employer" if "fumished for a substan-
tial noncompensatory business reason." Reg. § 1.119-
I(a)(2)(i). If meals periods have to be limited because
of work load that will usually constitute a "substantial
noncompensatory reason." Reg. § 1.119-1 (a)(2)(ii)(b).
Further, there is no need that this need exists with
respect to all of the company's employees; it is suffi-
cient that it exist with respect to -substantially all" the
employees. This company's failure to carry the day on
the § 119 exclusion came down to its inability to meet
this standard. The information that it offered related to
only 65 percent of its employees (not "substantially
all"). Further, it was deficient in showing the need for a
short lunch period; it was noted that for some
employees the objective could have been met by work-
ing a longer day. What the company had to do was to
demonstrate that the negative effect of a longer work
day (since the IRS takes the position that the shorter
lunch period can't be adopted just to let the employees
off earlier in the day). Reg. § 1. 119-1 (a)(2)(ii)(b). Per-
haps the IRS has set an almost insurmountable stand-
ard to justify the 30 or 35 minute lunch period. Is the
IRS requiring a showing that extension of the current
work day is not feasible? If it is that may be a tough
burden to carry.
DECEMBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Patent Infringement Proceeds
Received by Divorced Spouse
Tax-free to Her Per §1041
The transfer of property incident to a divorce is
treated as a gift (that is, it is tax-free) to the transferee.
§ 1041 (b). Such transfers can take many forms other
than the garden variety transfer of marital assets. In
LTR 9143050 the husband, an inventor, was the plain-
tiff, during marriage, in several patent infringement
suits with respect to patents in which only he had an in-
terest. During the pendency of these proceedings the
husband and his wife were divorced. The divorce settle-
ment agreement granted the wife a stated percentage
of any proceeds from these proceedings. When one of
the cases eventually settled the proceeds available to
the plaintiff were placed in a bank account with it dis-
bursing to the wife the agreed upon percentage, thus
raising the issue of whether § 1041 shielded her from
taxation of her receipt of these amounts. Naturally, the
receipt of damage payments for patent infringement are
generally taxable to the recipient. Thus, if the wife
were considered to have received, pursuant to the
divorce decree, an ownership stake in the pending
proceeding, her receipt of a damage allocation would
likely be considered as income to her. The IRS, how-
ever, viewed her as having been entitled, per the
divorce decree, only to payment from her ex-husband
equal to a certain percentage of the income produced
by the property. This analysis saved the wife from in-
come tax on the receipt (it being clear, also, that the
receipt was not alimony since the obligation to make
the payments would survive her death). State law, and
to a great extent the manner in which the divorce
decree was drawn, would play the largest role in deter-
mining the tax consequences in such a situation. Ob-
viously, the lesson here is that when property is in-
volved which is largely or wholly the potential right to
receive income (i.e., a claim for taxable damages), tax-
free treatment to the recipient is more likely to be
achieved when the transferee receives only a right to a
portion of the income rather than a part of the claim it-
self.
OCTOBER 1991
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Incorporated Farm May Deduct
Meals and Lodging Even Though
Benefit Excluded by Incorporators
The threat of §269 application upon formation of a
corporation, which denies deductions where the ac-
quisition is made with a tax avoidance purpose, is one
that is always present. What is its application where
sole proprietors incorporate a family farm and sub-
sequently enter into an employment contract with the
corporation whereby the latter provides lodging and
meals to the incorporators ( so they may live on the
premises to take care of the livestock)? Does the deduc-
tibility of the meals and lodging costs, under § 162, as-
sociated with the exclusion of such benefit by the
shareholder-employees, under § 119, set the stage for
denial of the § 162 deduction to the corporation, as as-
serted by the agent in the matter involved in LTR
9134003? While it was the combination of corporate
deduction and shareholder-employee excludability that
whetted the Service's interest, further analysis
demonstrated that the combined benefit of a § 162
deduction and a § 119 exclusion could have been avail-
able absent incorporation. For example, the lease of
property to a partnership composed of former sole
proprietors would have permitted partnership deduc-
tion of the meals and lodging expenses and § 119 ex-
clusion to the partners. Thus, it can't be said that the
corporation would have been acquired for the purpose
of obtaining a deduction not otherwise obtainable. The
IRS went further, however, by stating that even if the
motive were to obtain a § 162 deduction with no offset-
ting income inclusion there would be no corporate
deduction disallowance since the corporation's deduc-
tion, otherwise permitted by statute, would not con-
stitute avoidance..Thus, since there is no §269 applica-
tion simply because corporate deduction is matched
with income exclusion by the transferor, the way is
open for family farm incorporation and §1 19 exclusion
for the received benefits.
JANUARY 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Cash Meal Alto wances Not
Excludable as a De Minimis Fringe
and Subject to Withholding
A few weeks ago the IRS released a ruling holding
that on-site meals for employees are ineligible for the
§ 119 exclusion. See. LTR 9143003 discussed in Leter
Ruling, Review, Dec. 1991, p 2. More recently the IRS
has opined on another aspect of this issue, i.e., whether
cash allowances for meals are an excludable fringe
benefit (§ 132) and whether, if taxable, they are subject
to withholding. In LTR 9148001 a utility company had
a longstanding policy (incorporated in the company's
collective bargaining agreement) of providing cash al-
lowances for meals when work prevented employees
from having meals at the regular time. For example,
employees doing emergency work outside regular
worktime were entitled to an allowance at four-hour in-
tervals. Further, an allowance was also available if an
employee worked more than one hour beyond regular
work hours or preformed work more than two hours
before work normally began. The end-of-day allowan-
ces were compensated for through payment of $ I
whereas the pre-work or mid-day allowances resulted in
a payment of $5.50. Although employees were entitled
to the actual cost of the meal if they presented a receipt,
in practice most elected to take the cash meal al-
lowance. The allowances were paid regardless of
whether the employee actually purchased a meal. The
employer's position was that the payments were within
the exclusion (§ 132(e)) for de minitnis fringe benefits,
specifically the exclusion provided for in the regulations
(Reg. § 1. 132-6T(d)(2)) for "occasional supper money."
The IRS, primarily for the reason that the payments
were "routine" and not "occasional," found them not to
be a de minimis fringe. With respect to the employer's
assertion that it was administratively difficult to deter-
mine frequency since payments were made through its
petty cash voucher system it was observed the proce-
dures used by the employer were not determinative for
this purpose. More important was whether "the costs as-
sociated with determining frequency...would exceed the
nominal tax revenue generated by including the value of
the benefits in income." Next came the touchy issue of
whether the allowances were "wages" imposing on the
employer (in 1985) an obligation to withhold. The
employer argued that the meal allowance should not
have been subject to withholding because (citing
§§3121 (a)(20) and 3401 (a)(1 9) and Central Illinois
Public Service Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 21 (1978)) it was
reasonable to believe that the employee would have
been able to exclude the benefit under § 132. The IRS,
in reaching the opposite conclusion, and in denying
§7805(b) relief, noted tiat whatever uncertainty existed
on this issue when Central Illinois was decided, had
been plainly resolved by the enactment of § 132. (See,
also, LTR 9146003, which held that truckers' per diem
allowances while away from home on the road were
subject to income tax withholding and employment
taxes.) Thus, it appears that if there is any kind of
regularity to the payment of meal allowances (and a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement would
seem to provide the requisite regularity) the IRS is
going to impose definite obligations on the employer to
withhold and the employee to include.
AUGUST 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Excess Sick Leave Transferred To
Account For Payment Of Future
Medical Expenses Is Taxable
It is clear, of course, that unused sick-leave credits
that are received in cash are includible in income.
Rev. Rul. 75-539, 1975-2 C.B. 45. As a variation the
employer (the state government) in LTR 9227035
adopted a plan whereby the employee could elect, both
with respect to past excess sick leave (i.e., the balance
above 480 hours) and prospectively for the coming
year, to convert excess sick leave hours (at a 25 per-
cent of compensation rate) into cash which was to be
deposited into a state account to pay the employee's
medical expenses upon retirement or separation from
service after age 55. Such an election prevented an
employee from receiving cash outright for the excess
leave. If the employee dies the amount on deposit will
continue to be available for the benefit of the
employee's spouse or for dependents. If the spouse
dies (or the employee is unmarried) the amount on
deposit will be transferred to an administrative account
to pay costs of the plan. Using assignment of income
concepts (i.e., Comm. v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260
(1958)), the IRS held that an election to participate in
this plan, instead of receiving the cash, was the
equivalent of the employee receiving the cash and
paying it over to the plan. This conclusion was reached
"'notwithstanding that the income may be used to pur-
chase a nontaxable benefit." See, sections 104(a)(3);
105(b). See, also, section 105(e). The IRS withheld
ruling (see, Rev. Proc. 92-3, 1992-1 I.R.B. 63), how-
ever, on the issue of the treatment of reimbursements
made from the plan (although it would seem that any
such payments should be tax-free to the recipient).
SEPTEMBER 1992
LE'iTER RULING REVIEW
Use Of Grantor Trust Avoids 1041
When Property With Debt In Excess
Of Basis To Go To Spouse
Transfers incident to a divorce are not gain realizing
events nor are they income to the recipient. Sec. 1041.
However, this provision does not apply to the extent
that liabilities are assumed (or the property is taken
subject to) in excess of the basis of the property trans-
ferred. If, therefore, section 1041 applies to the trans-
fer of partnership interests in a context in which the
amount of liabilities to which the partnership interest is
subject exceeds the basis of the transferor in such in-
terests, the transaction will result in gain recognition to
the transferor. See, section 1041(e). However, LTR
9230021 charts a way in which such property can be used
to provide value to a transferee spouse without gain
recognition. Therein the transferor (settlor) transferred
the partnership interests to a trust for the benefit of his
spouse. Although the trust had an independent trustee
the grantor retained the power to remove the trustee and
appoint a replacement (including himself). The trust's
terms provided for payment to the grantor's spouse of so
much income as the trustee deems appropriate (and, fur-
ther, to make corpus distributions pursuant to the same
standard). Because the distributions were not limited
by a reasonably ascertainable standard (Reg. section
1.674(b)-I(b)(5)(i)) the exception for treatment as a trust
taxable to the grantor did not apply. See, sections
674(a), (b)(5)(A), (d). Further, the grantor's right to
replace the trustee prevented another exception (sec-
tion 674(c)) from applying. Thus, since the trust was a
grantor trust (all the income of which was taxed to the
grantor/settlor) the IRS concluded that there was no
"'transfer of property," thereby rendering section 1041 in-
applicable. It appears, therefore, that gain recognition can
be sidestepped when property subject to debt in excess of
basis is transferred in the context of a marital dissolution
by making an irrevocable transfer (thereby satisfying
the transferee spouse) to a trust taxable to the grantor.
JUNE 1992
LETTER RULING REVIEW
Grantor Trust's Capital Losses Don't
Pass Thru To Beneficiaries
In LTR 9220012 an irrevocable trust had been
created for the benefit of a chiild of the settlors' pur-
suant to which the child (A) was the trustee and in-
come beneficiary. Upon reaching the age of 40 the
beneficiary was possessed the right to withdraw corpus
amounts. In a prior year, A had resigned as trustee and
an independent and unrelated trustee was named. After
the trust sustained short term capital losses (which
were carried forward since the trust did not have suffi-
cient covering gains) an appropriate court order was
obtained which eliminated the beneficiary's power to
invade corpus. Presumably on the notion that he was
the "owner" of the trust (per §678) A, the beneficiary,
claimed the capital losses on his return. While this was
justified for the years prior to the beneficiary's release
of the power to withdraw corpus, the IRS held that this
was not the case for the years subsequent to the release
of the power. Pursuant to tie Uniform Principal and
Income Act (adopted by the relevant state in LTR
9220012) capital gains and losses are allocable to cor-
pus. Thus, while the beneficiary possessed the power
over corpus, after attaining the age of 40, it would be
proper (per §§677 and 678(a)) to allocate the capital
losses (a corpus item) to the beneficiary. After the
release of the corpus power, the capital losses are
properly chargeable to the trust itself (a result which
one expects was not anticipated when the beneficiary
sought and obtained the release of the power to
withdraw corpus).
